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THE MODERN AMERICAN
Letter from the Executive Board

T

he Modern American re-emerged this summer even more modern than ever, after the completion of our seven-month Strategic
Plan Initiative. Many of the publication’s changes readers will never
see, but others, like our new cover art, design, and content features,
are exciting changes for our six-year old publication.
In addition to a newer look and content, TMA has gone digital. Now, TMA offers twenty-first century discussion about law and
politics on twenty-first century platforms, including our new blog,
Modern America, and our new Digital Commons website. Modern
America features regular contributions about current happenings
in law, politics, and culture, much like The Modern American print issue. Readers will notice a number of recommended blog entries at
the end of articles and features that are topically-related to the print
content, for example. TMA has also joined the Digital Commons,
the leading online repository for scholarly legal work in the country.
TMA’s Digital Commons page will include dual platform publication of current issues, volume archives, featured content ranked by
popularity, as well as another submission venue for authors. We are
delighted to join the Digital Commons community, and hope you
visit us at our new cyberspace home.
Finally, amidst all of these changes, we are interested in
hearing from YOU, our readers, about yourselves and TMA’s coming-of-age. At the back of this issue is our first Readers’ Survey.
Please take a few minutes to fill-out the paper or online survey so that
we can learn more about our growing audience, and your thoughts
about the publication. The more we learn about who you are, the better we can fulfill our mission to elevate non-traditional and marginalized voices and issues in the law. Plus, participants will enter a raffle
to win an Ipod shuffle. More information can be found at the survey
announcement toward the end of the issue.
As the Volume 6 Executive Board makes way for the Volume 7 leaders, we want to thank our readers, authors, staff, advisors,
and every other person who helped make Volume 6 and the Strategic
Plan such a huge success. We are excited about the publication’s future and wish The Modern American six more ground-breaking years.
Modern America: The Modern American’s Law & Politics Blog,
www.wclmodernamerican.blogspot.com.
The Modern American @ the Digital Commons,
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/tma/.
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A FRAUDULENT SENSE OF BELONGING:
THE CASE FOR REMOVING THE
‘FALSE CLAIM TO CITIZENSHIP’
By: Anne Parsons 1
I. Introduction
I have been a permanent resident for about 10
years. When I decided to apply for US citizenship
I realized that I might be ineligible because when
applying for my ﬁrst driver’s license I also became
registered to vote. At the time, I did not understand
that permanent residents are not allowed to vote. The
fact that a governmental ofﬁcial asked me to register
(even though at that point my greencard was my only
ofﬁcial ID) and actual issuance of a registration
card made me even more ensured [sic] that I am
an eligible voter. If I recall correctly, the Election
Day was shortly after and I am almost positive that
I voted during these elections. However, soon later,
when talking with another greencard holder I was
informed that I am not eligible to vote. Since that
point on, I never voted and whenever asked if I wish
to register I make a point to inform those who ask
that “as a permanent resident I am not eligible.”
Other than that, my record is perfectly clean. Do
I still have a chance to become naturalized? Is
it truly a deportable offense? Is there a way, and
should I try to ﬁnd out whether I actually voted?
There must be more people who made the same
mistake as I did, is there a way to ﬁnd out what
percentage is denied citizenship on similar grounds?2
A little known fact in U.S. history is that noncitizens3
once had the right to vote in local, state, and even national
elections.4 Today, not only are noncitizens largely prohibited
from voting, except in a few local jurisdictions, noncitizens may
lose their chance to become citizens, and face the additional
threats of deportation and criminal sanctions for voting or
merely registering to vote. While noncitizens have always
faced consequences for fraud or willful misrepresentation
of a material fact under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”),5 the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 19966 (commonly known as “IIRIRA”
or “IIRAIRA”) changed the law in several ways, including by
adding speciﬁc grounds of inadmissibility and removability
related to voting in any local, state, or federal election.7
This paper criticizes IIRIRA’s addition of the “false
claim to citizenship” provision to regulate noncitizen voting
as inconsistent with the proper role of immigration law
in creating and deﬁning the body politic. Part I explores
democratic concepts of citizenship in the context of
4

noncitizen voting rights. This view of citizenship as political
voice and belonging, however, must inevitably confront the
perceived imperative of the modern nation-state to create
legal distinctions between citizens and non-citizens. Part I
then explores how the U.S. does so by examining theories
underlying the naturalization process and looking speciﬁcally
at how “citizenship” is deﬁned in current U.S. immigration law.
Part II brieﬂy examines the connection between
immigration policy and the gradual erosion of noncitizen
voting rights as a backdrop to IIRIRA’s creation of the
“false claim to citizenship” provisions. In Part III, the paper
argues that the IIRIRA amendments to the “false claim to
citizenship” provisions have several negative consequences.
First, the provisions risk unnecessarily excluding or
deporting viable candidates for citizenship, including longtime legal permanent residents (“LPRs”) like the individual
in the epitaph. Second, these provisions validate unfounded
concerns about noncitizen voter fraud, thereby further
polarizing the immigration debate in unproductive ways. And
third, the provisions are inconsistent with the underlying goals
of the naturalization process, and jeopardize noncitizens’
opportunity for meaningful political participation.
The paper concludes by suggesting various ways
the false claim to citizenship provisions could be reformed,
arguing that removing the immigration consequences
for noncitizens who vote is most in line with democratic
ideals. It calls upon immigrants’ advocates to reconsider
arguments for extending voting rights to noncitizens
in light of predicted demographic change and the
growing push for Comprehensive Immigration Reform.
II. What Makes a Citizen?
The legal deﬁnition of “citizen” is “a person
who, by either birth or naturalization, is a member of a
political community, owing allegiance to the community and
being entitled to enjoy all its civil rights and protections.”8
Constitutional democracies are premised on the notion
of consent by the governed, with the vote serving as the
primary mechanism through which members of the polity
realize democratic ideals.9 All democracies index insiders
and outsiders based on existing members’ collective notions
of who constitutes “the people.” If formal citizenship
is the marker of membership in the political community,
this means that in a democracy, noncitizens are governed
by the laws but do not have a formal voice. 10 Why and
how is formal citizenship taken into account in deﬁning
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the potential to lead to a more radical conclusion: that all
noncitizens with presence and a signiﬁcant stake in their
communities should have a voice in all those communities
in which they participate, whether local, state, or national.22
Theoretically speaking, however, a democracy is
a. Citizenship as Political Voice and Belonging
not obligated to extend suffrage to noncitizens.23 The U.S.
Constitution does not deny noncitizens the right to vote, 24
Today, with a few exceptions,11 formal citizenship is yet arguably neither does it require it.25 Whether a nationthe primary marker of an individual’s inclusion or exclusion state chooses to extend the vote to noncitizens might depend
in the body politic in the U.S.12 Despite the fact that certain on that particular state’s constitutional values in relation
classes of noncitizens, LPRs in particular, share many to noncitizens.26 The more constitutional protections
a state grants to noncitizens, the
characteristics with citizens—they pay
taxes, own property, and serve in the
more important it becomes for
armed forces—only citizens can vote. the effect of immigration law in deﬁning citizens to maintain the vote as a
And yet, this has not always been the case.
distinguishing and exclusive right.27
the body politic has become
In his socio-historical account
Correspondingly, the more courts
increasingly important
of noncitizen voting rights in the
extend to noncitizens the rights to due
U.S., Maryland State Senator and Law
process, free speech, and association,
Professor Jamin Raskin, notes that the
the less crucial the vote is for ensuring
extension of voting rights to noncitizens by states stemmed noncitizens’ political voice and sense of belonging.28 As
from a strong federalist paradigm.13 Depending on the time one scholar points out, this may explain why “[noncitizen]
period, states had different reasons for allowing noncitizens suffrage is, at once, insigniﬁcant and central” in the U.S.29
to vote.14 In the eighteenth century, states extended the
right to vote to propertied, white, male noncitizens both
b. Citizenship as Membership in a Nation-State
because they exhibited those attributes most valued in
electors, and because doing so allowed states to justify
In today’s world of increased border restrictions,
the exclusion of people without those attributes from the effect of immigration law in deﬁning the body politic
the ballot by delinking citizenship from the franchise.15 has become increasingly important.30 The increasing
Later, in the nineteenth century, states used the franchise overlap between immigration, criminal, and national
primarily to draw noncitizens to settle in their territory.16 security law has greatly enhanced the gate-keeping function
Raskin derives three interrelated normative of immigration law in the U.S.31 As a prime symbol of
arguments for alien suffrage based on state’s express or these conceptual overlaps, IIRIRA’s amendments to the
implied rationales for allowing noncitizens to vote. First, Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) signiﬁcantly
doing so logically follows from the democratic ideal of expanded the exclusionary function of immigration law.
“citizenship as presence,” in that extending the right to
Historically, immigration law played a minimal role
vote to noncitizens merely recognizes those individuals’ in regulating noncitizen voting rights, which instead were
participation in the social life of the community.17 Second, regulated by state election laws. Generally, laws that govern
allowing noncitizens to vote serves the practical function of the lives of noncitizens already living in the U.S. are termed
assimilating them to local values, a rationale Raskin terms “alienage laws,” as distinct from immigration laws which
“citizenship as integration.”18 A third and similar rationale, determine who has the right to be present in the ﬁrst place.32
“citizenship as standing,” reconstitutes the vote as a form In the U.S., both alienage laws that restrict noncitizens’ right
of public acknowledgement that noncitizens belong in to vote, and immigration laws that delineate the grounds of
American society.19 The latter two rationales provide strong inclusion and exclusion, play a role in deﬁning the body politic.
justiﬁcation for extending the vote to individuals who intend In comparison, in countries such as New Zealand that allow
to naturalize. Although current U.S. immigration law does not noncitizens to vote in national elections, immigration laws
explicitly distinguish between those who intend to become alone deﬁne the people.33 In reality, alienage and immigration
citizens and those who do not, LPR status is the closest laws often overlap,34 but they remain nonetheless analytically
proxy even though LPRs are not required to naturalize. Not distinct.35 For example, alienage laws often receive strict
surprisingly, serious arguments have been made that LPRs scrutiny by the courts,36 while Congress retains plenary
should be able to vote at the local level,20 and a few localities power over immigration law.37 Though both types of laws
in the U.S. have extended the franchise to this group.21 play a role in deﬁning the electorate, essentially, this paper
Serious consideration of the ﬁrst rationale, however, has argues that using immigration law, rather than alienage law,
the body politic? In its reference to naturalization, the
deﬁnition of citizenship hints at another fundamental
question: how do nations, and the U.S. in particular,
determine who becomes a citizen in the ﬁrst place?

SPRING 2011

5

to regulate noncitizen voting undermines the democratic presumption of equal rights.51 Only when an immigrant
ideals the immigration system should seek to promote.38 expresses her intention not to naturalize would that person
A society’s immigration statutes reﬂect its lose her citizen-like rights.52 While not erasing the distinction
perception of how the process of national self-deﬁnition between lawful immigrant and citizen completely, the
should take place. Conversely, whether and how a society view of immigration as transition would tend to support
permits noncitizens to vote depends on that society’s voting rights for intending citizens. Motomura argues
ideas about how the integration of
that, historically, the concept of
noncitizens should occur.39 According the more the law prioritizes a person’s ties transition played an important role.
to Immigration Scholar and Historian to the U.S., the less important formal In particular, he points to declarations
Hiroshi Motomura, U.S. immigration
of intent to naturalize, a feature of
citizenship becomes as a means of
law is a blend of three competing
U.S. immigration law from 1795 to
gaining rights.
views of immigration: immigration
1952, which could be ﬁled by eligible
as contract, immigration as afﬁliation,
noncitizens several years in advance
and immigration as transition.40 Each view reﬂects a model of a naturalization application, and which elevated the
of justice based on differing notions of the relative equality noncitizen to a pre-citizen status.53 For Motomura, the history
between citizens and noncitizens. Under the contract of transition and its emphasis on inclusion is an antidote
theory, citizens and noncitizens are not equal.41 Lawful to the logic of the other two concepts, which pervades
immigrants have the right to remain in the U.S. only so long the U.S.’s increasingly restrictive immigration policies.54
as they obey the rules.42 For Motomura, contract theory
is inadequate as an exclusive foundation for immigration
c. Citizenship in U.S. Immigration Law
law because the contract is one-sided—the immigrant
must take it or leave it.43 This violates the requirement
If immigration law plays a role in deﬁning the body
of consent underlying modern democratic politics.44 politic, citizenship and naturalization are the primary means
Afﬁliation is the second conceptual foundation by which it does so. People gain citizenship by birth in the
and serves as immigration law’s counterpart to Raskin’s U.S.,55 through naturalization,56 or in limited cases, by blood.57
notion of “citizenship as integration.”
Viewing The naturalization process in the U.S. has traditionally been
immigration as afﬁliation means that the longer that characterized as easy or open by international standards, which
lawful immigrants remain in the U.S., the more citizen- reﬂects the importance of naturalization as a governmental
like rights they gain.45 Paradoxically, the more the law objective.58 In other words, the U.S. government can justify
prioritizes a person’s ties to the U.S., the less important retaining a ﬁrm citizen/noncitizen distinction as an incentive
formal citizenship becomes as a means of gaining rights.46 for people to naturalize, so long as it compensates by making
One form of relief in U.S. immigration law that seems the transition to citizenship a relatively quick process.59
to reﬂect the afﬁliation concept is cancellation of removal.
Very generally, to qualify for citizenship,
Cancellation of removal is a form of relief that allows naturalization applicants must have lived in the U.S.
noncitizens who are otherwise inadmissible or deportable for at least ﬁve years as an LPR,60 or three years if they
to stay in the U.S. based, in part, on their length of residence are spouses of U.S. citizens.61 Applicants must meet a
in the country and other equities including the presence of minimum period of physical presence in the U.S.,62 in
family, property, or business ties. 47 In general, Motomura addition to demonstrating “good moral character.”63
sees current U.S. immigration law as a blend of the contract
In practice, the transition to citizenship is easy for
48
and afﬁliation theories. While the rationale for cancellation many people, and the denial rate is relatively low.64 Still,
of removal recognizes the inherent unfairness in severing denial rates do not account for those who fail to apply out
an individual’s ties to the U.S., in reality, the law also contains of fear of being denied. Many potential citizens ﬁnd the
an element of contract. To be eligible for cancellation of English and civics requirements insurmountable obstacles.
removal, for example, both LPRs and other noncitizens Others may not be able to pay the $675 application fee.
(“non-LPRs”) must prove that they have not committed Still others may not apply out of fear that past crimes
certain types of crimes.49 It is also worth mentioning, though or violations of immigration law will lead to a denial, or
perhaps not surprising, that the law as applied to non-LPRs even deportation. With IIRIRA’s dramatic expansion
includes more stringent “contractual terms” in addition to of the grounds for inadmissibility to, and removal
requiring a longer period of residence to establish eligibility.50 from, the U.S., these fears have gained new currency.
In contrast to the ﬁrst two views, immigration
as transition means that all lawful immigrants are treated
as potential citizens upon entry and thus beneﬁt from a
6
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III. From Suffrage to “Falsely Claiming Citizenship”
b. IIRIRA: A Fraudulent Sense of Belonging?
a. Restrictive Immigration and the Erosion of Noncitizen Voting
Rights
An undeniable correlation exists between U.S.
immigration policy and noncitizen voting rights.65
Noncitizens voted and held local ofﬁce throughout the
colonies beginning as early as 1692.66 The extension of
voting rights to noncitizens in the U.S. occurred during a
period of relatively open immigration. During the early
colonial period, the federal government left the regulation
of immigration, including alien suffrage, largely to the
states.67 Its ﬁrst attempt to create uniformity among the
states came with the passing of the 1790 Naturalization
Act, which regulated who could become a U.S. citizen.68
The federal government only began to centralize
control of immigration in the late nineteenth century.
Not surprisingly, throughout history, “the rise and
fall of xenophobic and nationalist tendencies” has greatly
impacted both immigration law and immigrant voting
rights.69 During the War of 1812, for example, increasing
suspicion of non-English immigrants decreased popular
support for noncitizen voting, 70 though voting rights
expanded again in the years leading up to the Civil War.71 At
the height of noncitizen voting in 1875, twenty-two states
and territories had extended the franchise to noncitizens.72
Beginning that same year, however, the U.S. government
passed a series of exclusion laws due in part to the inﬂux of
Chinese immigrants.73 As anti-immigrant sentiment began
to rise around the turn of the century, states one by one
terminated voting rights for noncitizens.74 The ﬁnal end to
noncitizen suffrage roughly coincides with the end of World
War I,75 which also put an end to unlimited immigration
and led to the creation of a nation-origins quota system.76
Even though the U.S. government eventually
centralized control over immigration matters, it did not seek
to regulate noncitizen voting. In fact, the government did
not create a provision barring entry for misrepresentation,
the statutory precursor to IIRIRA’s false claims provisions,
until after World War II.77 In 1952, the drafters of the
INA supported incorporation of the misrepresentation
provision into the permanent statute as an anti-communist
measure.78 Initially, the INA’s provisions related to false
claims were narrowly drawn: noncitizens were only guilty
of making a false claim to citizenship if the claim was
made to a U.S. government ofﬁcial for the purpose of
securing admission into the U.S.79 The 1986 Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendments80 signiﬁcantly strengthened
the fraud provisions, but continued to limit their application
to noncitizens who made material representation
for the purpose of receiving immigration beneﬁts.81
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These provisions changed again for the worse in 1996
when President Clinton signed IIRIRA into law. IIRIRA
closely followed another piece of legislation, the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 199682 (“AEDPA”), which
was enacted one year after the Oklahoma City bombing
to combat domestic and international terrorism. IIRIRA,
on the other hand, focused on illegal immigration reform.
According to former INS General Counsel, Paul W. Virtue,
IIRIRA represented the culmination of
immigration-reform efforts that began with
the Republican Party assuming majority
control of the House and Senate in 1994.
Congress was faced with the task of trying
to strengthen our national security in the
wake of the 1992 terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center, while at the same time,
trying to ﬁnd a way to discourage illegal
migration. What had started as separate
bills, one designed to reduce the annual
number of family and employment-based
immigrants to the United States
(legal immigration) and the other designed
to address border security and deportation
issues (illegal immigration), were combined
in each house and then split again due to
a concerted grass-roots lobbying effort.
Separated from the more popular illegalimmigration bills, the legal-immigration
measures were defeated in both houses.83
Although Congress rejected the proposed bill on
restrictions for “legal immigration,” many of IIRIRA’s
provisions, including those related to noncitizen voting,
have nonetheless affected authorized immigrants.84
Few of IIRIRA’s sixty-plus provisions are immigrantfriendly. To achieve its goal of curbing unauthorized
immigration, IIRIRA strengthened border security, initiated
the border fence project, added three and ten-year bars to readmission for immigration violators, tightened eligibility for
cancellation of removal, streamlined removal proceedings
for certain classes of immigrants, and severely restricted
judicial review.85 The legislation also instituted electronic
employment veriﬁcation pilot programs, and removed
public beneﬁts for most undocumented immigrants while
tightening eligibility restrictions for lawful immigrants.86
Similarly, AEDPA and IIRIRA both expanded
the criminal and non-criminal grounds of inadmissibility
and removal.87
IIRIRA also broadened the fraud
7

provisions of the INA and made penalties more stringent provisions were meant to appease those voters who believe
to support efforts to curb unauthorized immigration that politicians should not pander to noncitizens who cannot
at the border and in the workplace.88 IIRIRA added a vote anyway, though this is merely speculation. Whatever
ground of inadmissibility, which effectively extended the the reason, as discussed below, the impact of the provisions
applicability of the general misrepresentation ground to clearly falls hardest on legal immigrants, speciﬁcally those
false claims of citizenship made to private employers.89 applying to adjust status and legal permanent residents.
It also added a comparable ground of removability90 and
made it a crime to make a false claim of citizenship.91 IV. The Negative Consequences of an Illogical
Even though the general false claim to citizenship
Punishment
provisions could technically encompass unlawful voting
by immigrants, Congress added parallel provisions to
a. Immigration Consequences of Falsely Claiming Citizenship
deal speciﬁcally with that issue. Section 347 of IIRIRA
creates new grounds of inadmissibility and removal for
Although noncitizens are prohibited from voting
noncitizens who vote in violation of “any Federal, State, in all federal, and most state and local elections, registering
or local constitutional provisions, statute, ordinance, or to vote as a noncitizen is fairly easy and many noncitizens
regulation.”92 Though section 347 technically only applies may do so inadvertently. The National Voter Registration
to noncitizens who have actually voted, a noncitizen who Act of 1993100 (also known as the “Motor Voter Act”)
unlawfully registers to vote may also be inadmissible or requires states to provide individuals with the opportunity
removable under the broad “any purpose” language of the to register to vote when they apply for or renew their
general false claim to citizenship provisions.93 In contrast to driver’s license.101 Only ﬁfteen states require documentary
the unlawful voting provisions, the false claim provisions do proof of citizenship at the Department of Motor Vehicles
not require a ﬁnding that the individual violated underlying (“DMV”).102 Many states simply require the driver’s license
election law, only that the person falsely represented herself applicant or the DMV clerk to check a box to indicate the
as a U.S. citizen on or after September 30, 1996 for the individual’s citizenship status.103 Other states do not require
purpose of registering to vote or voting.94 Unlike the any proof of citizenship.104 DMV employees routinely ask
general false claims provisions, the provisions that apply driver’s license applicants whether they would like to register
speciﬁcally to unlawful voting are applicable retroactively.95 to vote and do not have to verify that the person is actually
Interestingly, IIRIRA creates two separate criminal eligible to vote.105 Noncitizens asked by a governmental
penalties for unlawful voting. Section 216 makes noncitizen ofﬁcial may assume they are eligible. Similarly, communityvoting in federal elections a general intent crime, punishable based organizations and voter registration campaigns may
by ﬁne and/or one year prison
also encourage noncitizens to vote.
sentence.96 In addition, IIRIRA further
Lastly, in contrast to the ﬁrst two
Only ﬁfteen states require documentary situations in which the noncitizen
provides that knowingly making a false
proof of citizenship at the
statement or claim to vote or register
registers inadvertently, the possibility
Department
of
Motor
Vehicles
to vote in any Federal, state, or local
exists that some noncitizens knowingly,
election constitutes a felony punishable
and
without
encouragement,
97
by ﬁne and/or ﬁve years in prison.
register
to
vote
and
vote.
In 2000, the Child Citizenship Act98 (“CCA”) added an
The above scenarios raise a key question—the issue
exception to the inadmissibility, removability, criminal of intent. The provisions that speciﬁcally address unlawful
prosecution, and ﬁnding of lack of good moral character voting do not explicitly require intent. If a noncitizen
provisions related to false claims to citizenship and unlawful votes in violation of federal, state, or local election law, that
voting, but it is extremely limited in its application.99 individual may be found inadmissible or removable under
Given Congress’s addition of speciﬁc and undeniably these provisions.106 Intent does come into play, however, in
harsh provisions to deal with noncitizen voting, this was the determination of whether the noncitizen violated election
presumably an issue of major concern. The legislative law by voting if the election statute requires a showing of
history, however, is silent on these provisions. On one speciﬁc intent. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
hand, their addition makes sense given Congress’s general policy guidelines clarify that in cases where the underlying
intent to curb fraud with the enactment of IIRIRA. On election law requires a ﬁnding of speciﬁc intent, adjudicating
the other hand, the provisions do not even loosely relate to ofﬁcers must assess the circumstances surrounding
the prevention of unauthorized immigration—the prospect the voting accordingly.107 If the ofﬁcer determines the
of voting in U.S. elections is not likely a main reason that individual knowingly violated the relevant election law,
people cross the border without authorization. Perhaps the the individual is removable subject to the ofﬁcer’s exercise
8
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of prosecutorial discretion.108 If there is no evidence of
speciﬁc intent and the statute requires such a showing, then
presumably the individual cannot be deemed removable.
It is less clear whether an individual can be deemed
inadmissible or removable absent a showing of intent
under the general provisions, which apply to false claims
of citizenship for any purpose or beneﬁt under state or
Federal law.109 The answer may hinge on the meaning of
“false” in the context of these provisions, a question which,
to date, no courts have addressed. One citizenship expert
suggested conﬂicting interpretations of the provision
based on two distinct meanings of “false.”110 A court may
construe the provision as embodying an intent requirement
based on the common understanding that false implies
“intentionally untrue.”111 On the other hand, a court may
construe Congress’s use of “falsely claiming” as an attempt
to distinguish this provision from adjacent ones dealing
with fraud and misrepresentation.112 The former provision
would clearly result in fewer immigration consequences
for noncitizens who are charged with inadmissibility
or removability under the false claims provisions,113
but for the moment, there is little indication how the
immigration agencies are actually implementing them.
The fact that a noncitizen voted or registered to
vote may become relevant at four points: application for
a nonimmigrant visa, application for relief from removal,
adjustment of status, and naturalization. It is unclear if
and how the various immigration agencies’ policies for
handling noncitizen voting issues differ, and whether some
agencies go to greater lengths than others to determine
whether a noncitizen has unlawfully voted or registered to
vote. Still, the following discussion outlines the provisions’
potential to negatively impact noncitizens at each stage.
i. Application for Nonimmigrant Visa
The provision may impact “nonimmigrants,” a legal
term used to designate noncitizens whose presence in the
U.S. is authorized on a temporary basis.114 A nonimmigrant
visa applicant who violates the false claims or unlawful
voter provisions can apply for a waiver.115 An otherwise
inadmissible applicant may only be granted admission
as a temporary nonimmigrant at the discretion of the
Attorney General.116 To qualify for a nonimmigrant visa,
however, most applicants must demonstrate that they do
not intend to stay in the United States.117 An individual
who has previously voted or registered to vote in the U.S.
will likely have a hard time convincing a consular ofﬁce
that she does not have the intention of staying.118 Thus,
in most circumstances the waiver will mean very little.

SPRING 2011

ii. Adjustment of Status
Under the INA, adjustment of status is treated
as an admission to the U.S. 119 Thus, if a noncitizen
becomes inadmissible as result of making a false claim
to citizenship for the purpose of voting or registering to
vote, or voting unlawfully, this will bar her from adjusting
her status to permanent residence.120 While there is a
waiver available for immigrants who are inadmissible under
the general misrepresentation provision, 121 there are no
waivers available for those who are found inadmissible as
a result of false claims to citizenship or unlawful voting.122
Currently, it is unclear how aggressively DHS
checks whether an applicant has registered to vote at
the adjustment of status stage. There are no questions
pertaining to unlawful voting on the adjustment of status
application.123 Still, some applicants have been denied on
these grounds.124 Regardless, given the increasing integration
of government databases, a mere change in policy
could make screening of this kind routine procedure. 125
iii. Relief from Removal
If a noncitizen is found removable as a result of
voting-related violations, she can still apply for relief from
removal. Unlawful voting or a false claim to citizenship
can affect eligibility for relief in several ways. First, if the
individual is in exclusion proceedings and the violation
constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, the individual
will be statutorily barred from applying for non-LPR
cancellation of removal.126 DHS has determined that a
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1015(f), the speciﬁc intent
provision, constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude.127
There do not appear to be any cases challenging this
designation, perhaps because convictions for knowingly
making a false statement or claim to vote or register to vote
are rare. In the same policy statement, DHS indicates that a
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 611, the general intent provision,
likely do not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude.128
Interestingly, if a noncitizen were found to have been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude as a result of
unlawful voting or false claims to citizenship, theoretically
that individual could apply for a discretionary waiver,129 even
though there is no way to directly waive the false claim to
citizenship or unlawful voting grounds of inadmissibility.
If the individual is in removal proceedings, rather than
exclusion proceedings, false claims to citizenship constitute
an independent bar to non-LPR cancellation of removal.130
Second, even if the conviction does not constitute a
crime involving moral turpitude a violation may preclude an
individual from establishing good moral character, a statutory
requirement for certain forms of relief such as non-LPR
9

cancellation of removal and voluntary departure.131 Any
two or more convictions, regardless of whether the offenses
involve moral turpitude, can preclude a ﬁnding of good
moral character if the aggregate sentences to conﬁnement
were ﬁve years or more.132 Additionally, conﬁnement to a
penal institution for 180 days or more bars a ﬁnding of good
moral character.133 An individual can only avoid the bar if he
or she met the narrow exception established by the CCA.134
Lastly, even in the absence of a criminal conviction,
a violation negatively factors into the discretionary
analysis accompanying many applications for relief
including asylum, voluntary departure, and both LPR
and non-LPR cancellation of removal. For noncitizens
who lack strong equities, voting or registering to vote,
could be a deciding factor in a denial of relief, depending
on the immigration judge. Further, many types of
discretionary decisions are not subject to judicial review.135

claims determine the outcome of an application because
DHS does not publish statistics of its denial rate speciﬁc
to these grounds. It is equally impossible to tell how many
LPRs do not ﬁle applications for fear that they will be denied.
The lack of immigrant waiver and very limited exception
means the laws will have the hardest impact on applicants
at the adjustment of status and naturalization stages, in
other words, the most viable candidates for citizenship.
b. Polarizing the Immigration Debate

Immigration law deﬁnes the body politic “by
establishing a ladder of accession to permanent residence
and then formal U.S. citizenship.”144 The immigration
debate focuses on what set of criteria a noncitizen must
be required to meet before her inclusion into the body
politic.145 Although lawmakers may have rational reasons
for withholding voting rights for noncitizens,146 it does
iv. Naturalization
not follow that it is thus rational or necessary to deny
immigration beneﬁts to and potentially deport noncitizens
The provisions’ biggest impact is likely to be at the who vote or register to vote in violation of election law.
naturalization stage. After IIRIRA, all ofﬁcers conducting
Congress enacted IIRIRA in response to the
naturalization interviews are required to ask the applicant if growing fears over “illegal immigration.”147 Ironically,
she has ever voted or registered to vote in any election in the since the enactment of IIRIRA, immigration experts
United States.136 In addition, the application for naturalization have criticized the legislation on the grounds that it has
was amended to include questions related to false claims contributed to an increase in the number of unauthorized
and voting.137 If the individual violated relevant election immigrants in the U.S.148 It is no coincidence that IIRIRA
law or made a false claim to citizenship when registering to passed shortly after AEDPA, which Congress enacted
vote or voting, and the applicant does not qualify for one primarily to combat the threat of international terrorism.
of the CCA exceptions, the adjudicator’s decision to initiate Advocates and academics alike have decried the increasingly
removal proceeding is one of prosecutorial discretion.138 frequent discursive linkages made by lawmakers between
If the adjudicator decides that the case merits illegal immigration, crime, and terrorism as a sort of fearprosecutorial discretion, the adjudicator must still make a mongering.149 While the rule of law and national security are
good moral character ﬁnding.139 If a
undeniably of utmost importance to all
Immigration
law
deﬁnes
the
body
politic
noncitizen has actually been convicted
members of a society, the negative
under either of the voting related “by establishing a ladder of accession consequences of this rhetoric are
provisions, then the same analysis to permanent residence and then formal clear: an increasingly polarized, and
outlined above applies.140
In the
oftentimes vitriolic, immigration debate.
U.S. citizenship.”
absence of a conviction or a ﬁnding
The thrust of the debate is the big
that a conviction constitutes a crime
question of line drawing—who is “in”
involving moral turpitude, DHS policy guidelines suggest and who is “out” and, just as important, who has the right to
that if the violation occurred in the distant past and the decide. In the context of voting rights, the debate centers on
individual can establish good moral character “in spite of the issue of voter fraud. Anti-immigrant advocacy groups
making a false claim to U.S. citizenship,” the adjudicator and media personalities frequently allege that noncitizen
may exercise her discretion favorably, though DHS voting is undermining the integrity of the electoral process
guidelines set the bar fairly high.141 If the adjudicator and manipulating election outcomes.150 These voices use fear
denies the application, the noncitizen must apply for of widespread voter fraud by noncitizens to gain support
administrative review of the decision within thirty days.142 for stricter immigration policies.151 The false claims and
If she fails on the second review, as a last resort, the unlawful voter provisions validate and legitimize those fears,
applicant can petition a federal district court to conduct regardless of the real—de minimis—extent of the problem.
a de novo review of her eligibility for naturalization.143
Those seeking to counter claims of widespread voter
It is impossible to tell how often voting-related false fraud by noncitizens frequently argue that voter fraud is rare,
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largely because the consequences of committing voter fraud especially if the noncitizen did so unknowingly.158 A single
are so disproportionate to the individual’s gain of a single fraudulent vote is not likely to undermine the integrity of the
vote.152 Though convincing, this argument is not alone electoral process, and yet, the consequences of deportation
sufﬁcient to counter arguments in favor of maintaining the to an individual are enormous.159 Neither agency discretion
IIRIRA provisions. For one, if noncitizen voter fraud is a nor the availability of forms of relief mitigates this fact.160
myth then the false claims and unlawful
For one, cancellation of removal and
voting provisions do no harm. Likewise, The tension between democratic norms other forms of removal relief are quite
one might argue, if noncitizens do of inclusion and the inherently exclusive limited in their availability.161 Second,
commit voter fraud, then the provisions function of immigration law may never in both cases, the adjudicator—
are necessary as a deterrent in the
either an immigration judge or an
be
fully
resolved.
rational actor’s cost-beneﬁt analysis.
agency ofﬁcial—is choosing between
There are several responses, however,
imposing the sanction or not imposing
162
that highlight both the irrationality and the destructive effect the sanction.
Thus, the exercise of discretion does not
of IIRIRA’s false claims and unlawful voting provisions. “inject proportionality” into the immigration system, simply
First, even if noncitizens are voting or registering put, because there are no alternative sanctions available.163
to vote, studies have largely debunked the myth that
Lastly, even if noncitizen voting is rare, the IIRIRA
153
noncitizen voting has improperly inﬂuenced elections.
false claims and unlawful voting provisions are far from
Those individuals who violate election laws likely do so benign. For one, the provisions apply not only to those
unintentionally. Either they believe they are citizens, who vote, but also to those who register to vote.164 Those
or they are not aware that only citizens can vote. Many noncitizens that are found inadmissible or removable
noncitizens may register to vote, at the DMV for example, for either violation are equally negatively impacted—they
but never actually cast a vote, in which case they have no may be denied immigration beneﬁts and face possible
In addition, the provisions bolster the
effect on the outcome of elections. There have been a few deportation.165
154
In rhetoric of anti-immigration advocates. Perhaps most
incidents or allegations of larger-scale voter fraud.
those types of cases, however, individual noncitizens are disturbing, however, is their symbolic import. In essence,
led to believe they can vote by trusted community-based the IIRIRA provisions use elections, the symbol of the
organizations. These situations are likely to be rare. Even democratic process itself, to enforce immigration law. It
where noncitizens face draconian enforcement measures, is difﬁcult to imagine what could be further from the
like what is currently happening in Arizona,155 immigrant aspirational view of democracy as “citizenship as presence.”166
advocacy groups are unlikely to risk the political and
criminal consequences of encouraging noncitizens to vote
c. An Improper Role for Immigration Law
when alternate methods of advocacy exist. Thus, as long
as advocacy groups are aware of the voter restrictions, they
The tension between democratic norms of inclusion
are unlikely to use noncitizen voting as a strategic tool. and the inherently exclusive function of immigration law
Second, the IIRIRA provisions are not necessary to may never be fully resolved. Still, as Motomura suggests in
deter voter fraud. The laws likely do not factor into the his analysis of three different conceptions of immigration
individual’s decisional calculus because most noncitizens, law, society can choose the degree to which it incorporates
and even many immigration attorneys, are not aware of notions of equality into the immigration system.167
the consequences of making a false claim to citizenship or Regardless of a society’s ultimate decision to incorporate
even what making a false claim entails.156 Even assuming noncitizens into the political process, the body politic has
that noncitizens are aware of the consequences of a duty to ensure that U.S. immigration law both serves the
making a false claim in the context of voting, the threat needs of society and reﬂects societal ideals.168 In this respect,
of deportation or denial of immigration beneﬁts is not IIRIRA’s provisions represent a huge step backwards.
necessary to deter noncitizens. Noncitizens who knowingly
Motomura’s call to view immigration as transition
commit voter fraud can be prosecuted under existing requires revisiting the idea of extending voting rights to
state and federal laws, which impose signiﬁcant penalties noncitizens.169 For Motomura, “immigration as transition
for unlawful voting.157 Immigration law can then treat means treating lawful immigrants as Americans in waiting
these convictions the same way they treat all convictions. from their ﬁrst day in this country.”170 Because immigration
From a deterrence perspective, it is simply not necessary as transition presumes full equality for LPRs who intend
to create separate grounds of inadmissibility and removal. to naturalize,171 logically, this leads to the conclusion that
Using deportation to sanction noncitizens for voting LPRs should have some voting rights.172 Raskin and others
or registering to vote is grossly disproportionate to the offense, have convincingly argued that LPRs should be allowed to
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vote in local elections.173 Motomura echoes these proposals
There are numerous problems with this rationale in
with the qualiﬁcation that voting rights for LPRs should be the case of the false claims and unlawful voting provisions.
temporally limited to the ﬁve-year period during which they First, the terms of the contract are unclear—what is a “false
are not allowed to naturalize.174 Motomura’s proposal to claim to citizenship” anyway?184 Second, at least in the case
view immigration as transition bears signiﬁcant resemblance of the unlawful voting provision, which applies retroactively,
to the history of noncitizen voting in the U.S. as described by noncitizens do not get notice.185 Third, noncitizens may
Raskin. For Motomura, immigration law could do a better not reasonably expect to be denied immigration beneﬁts
job of recognizing the role of LPRs in modern American or deported for voting or merely registering to vote.
society (“citizenship as standing”).175 In addition, extending Motomura echoes the concerns, discussed above, about
the franchise to LPRs serves the
the inadequacy of cancellation of
practical function of “foster[ing] civic
removal and discretion for preserving
From an advocacy perspective,
education and involvement as aspects of
fairness.186 Lastly, noncitizens have
these provisions should be a
integration and transition to citizenship”
little choice over the terms.187 While
176
(“citizenship
as
integration”).
Motomura highlights the unequal
wake-up call.
Prior to the enactment of
bargaining power of noncitizens visIIRIRA, noncitizen voting in the
à-vis many aspects of the immigration
U.S. most closely resembled Motomura’s second concept system, nowhere is this more clearly reﬂected than in the
of immigration as afﬁliation. The logic of immigration IIRIRA provisions: noncitizens may be deported for
as afﬁliation prescribes that lawful immigrants gain rights participating, even unknowingly, in the process through
proportionate to their length of time in the country.177 In which their political rights are denied in the ﬁrst place.
a system that is mostly based on the afﬁliation concept, In that sense, the IIRIRA provisions are doubly punitive.
the importance of naturalization is deemphasized since
While these provisions make up only a small part
LPRs eventually gain most of the rights of citizenship.178 of the immigration system as a whole, they are nevertheless
Motomura points out that in certain European countries that important because of the values they reﬂect. The provisions’
closely ﬁt the immigration as afﬁliation model of citizenship, attempt to validate the concerns of some citizens that the
resident noncitizens are allowed to vote in local elections.179 line between citizen and noncitizen has grown blurry risks
If naturalization is a priority in the U.S., under the afﬁliation further marginalizing noncitizens from the political process.
rationale, it makes sense to withhold certain rights, such as Noncitizens have the right to participate politically through
the right to vote, in order to provide noncitizens with the grassroots organizing and other informal channels.188
incentive to naturalize.180 The withholding of voting rights, Even if one accepts the premise that denying noncitizens
however, is only justiﬁed so long as noncitizens actually the right to vote is a legitimate part of self-deﬁnition in
beneﬁt from other constitutional protections.181 While it is a democracy, the IIRIRA provisions go one step too far
debatable whether the rights of noncitizens were sufﬁciently in that they deny noncitizens even the potential to have
protected prior to the enactment of IIRIRA, when noncitizen a voice—formal or informal. In Motomura’s words, “In
voting rights were governed exclusively by election law (with the context of national self-deﬁnition, focusing only on
criminal sanctions attached), the balance, though perhaps promises, notice, and expectations is too narrowly utilitarian
not ideal, was still justiﬁable under democratic principles. and cavalier in its dismissal of equality, even where, as in
The landscape changed with the enactment of immigration and citizenship, some inequality is assumed.”189
IIRIRA, which essentially gave immigration law a role to play
in regulating noncitizen voting. This aspect of immigration V. Time for Radical Reform?: The Meaning of
law now most fully embodies the view of immigration as
“Citizenship” for Noncitizens
contract, with the grounds of inadmissibility and removal
representing the “terms” of the contract. Before, noncitizens
As currently written, the IIRIRA false claims
who voted unlawfully had only to suffer the criminal and unlawful voting provisions solidly reject the notion
consequences, though still severe, of their actions. Now, the of “citizenship as presence.” This paper has argued that
fact that a noncitizen voted or registered to vote is by itself, these provisions have threatened rather than protected
sufﬁcient grounds for terminating that individual’s “contract” American democratic ideals. There are many easy ﬁxes
to remain in the United States.182 The contract theory of that could mitigate their effects to some degree. Congress
immigration, as described by Motomura, is premised on could amend the provisions to explicitly incorporate
the notion that fairness and justice can be achieved through a speciﬁc intent requirement, or make an immigrant
notice, promise, and expectations, rather than through any waiver available, similar to one that exists for fraud and
assumption that noncitizens are entitled to equal rights.183 misrepresentation. In the end, however, these solutions
12
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do not go far enough. If naturalization and integration
are main goals of the immigration system, immigration law
cannot treat formal citizenship as an impermeable border.
At the very least, the provisions must be removed. Even
then, more is required to transition to a system that more
fully accounts for the true role of noncitizens in society. 190
From an advocacy perspective, these provisions
should be a wake-up call. Certainly, for the time being,
immigration attorneys must pay greater attention to the
implications of these provisions for their individual clients.
But, the provisions raise even greater issues in the context
of immigration reform: in whatever form it is likely to take,
it is ironic that those most likely to be affected do not have a
formal voice in the process. Advocacy groups should push
for the removal of these provisions, which both literally and
symbolically silence the noncitizen voice. Advocates should
also consider pushing for more radical reform, perhaps
even going so far as to reinvigorate the noncitizen suffrage
movement. Given the growing political inﬂuence of recently
naturalized citizens, 191 the time may soon be right for such
a movement, even if its scope is limited to voting rights at
the local level.192 In the end, if the project of self-deﬁnition
excludes individuals like the one whose story began this
paper, we have to question the validity of the project.
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INSECURE COMMUNITIES: HOW INCREASED LOCALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT UNDER PRESIDENT OBAMA THROUGH THE SECURE COMMUNITIES
PROGRAM MAKES US LESS SAFE, AND MAY VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION
By: Rachel Zoghlin1
An undocumented immigrant who lives in
Maryland was recently stopped by the police while walking
to the Hyattsville Metro Station to go to work. Short, darkskinned and Latino, with long, black hair, the police told
him that he resembled someone suspected of mugging an
old woman a few blocks away. The police questioned him
about his whereabouts (home) and what he was doing that
morning (getting ready for work). After approximately
forty-five minutes, the police officers received a signal that
some the real mugger had been apprehended across town,
so the officers allowed the man to continue on his commute
to work. What would have happened if he lived in Virginia
(where Secure Communities is active state-wide) and not
Maryland (where Secure Communities is only active in
three counties)? What if the police never got the call that
other officers had located the actual culprit? A completely
innocent Mexican waiter with no criminal record, who takes
English classes, pays his taxes, and supports his family, may
have been deported.
In the wake of fiery controversy surrounding
Arizona’s contentious immigration bill, S.B. 1070, the issue
of localization of immigration enforcement sprung to the
forefront of national political debate. Yet, S.B. 1070 is
certainly not the first instance of localities, unhappy with
federal immigration enforcement, taking matters into their
own hands. De-centralization of immigration enforcement
is a growing trend, and has been the subject of much legal
debate. Virginia recently adopted one method of localized
immigration enforcement, the Secure Communities
program, making it “active” in all Virginia jurisdictions.2
Similarly, D.C. Police Chief Cathy Lanier has lobbied for
the implementation of Secure Communities in the District
of Columbia.3 In the D.C., Maryland and Virginia area,
advocates on both sides of the debate have been ramping
up their efforts to sway legislators and constituents.4
Of the three million sets of fingerprints taken at
local jails between the onset of the Secure Communities
program in October 2008 and June of this year, nearly 47,000
fingerprints belonged to undocumented immigrants, against
whom deportation proceedings were initiated.5 Nearly
half of the individuals removed from the United States
through Secure Communities have never been convicted of
a crime.6
This article will introduce the Secure Communities
program within the context of the increased localization
of immigration enforcement. It will also discuss some
20

inherent problems with the program. Part I will explain
how the program works and address arguments made for
and against the program. Part II will discuss the rights
maintained by immigrants, and the rights they are denied by
virtue of their non-citizen status. Part III will examine the
constitutionality of Secure Communities through an Equal
Protection lens. Finally, Part IV will address the future of
the Secure Communities program and the future of localized
immigration enforcement, by discussing the potential impact
of pending litigation, legislation, and advocacy within the
immigration law field. Part VI will also propose an alternative
to the localized immigration enforcement movement, and
will advise interested individuals on ways to advocate against
the implementation of the Secure Communities program in
our local community.
I. The Move Towards Localized Immigration
Enforcement
In 1976, the Supreme Court held in De Canas v.
Bica that although the “[p]ower to regulate immigration is
unquestionably exclusively a federal power . . . [not every
state law] which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of
immigration and thus per se preempted by this constitutional
power.”7 Still, the Supremacy Clause, in Article VI, clause 2
of the Constitution, has been frequently invoked to give the
Federal Government exclusive jurisdiction over matters as
international in nature as immigration. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that state attempts to enact legislation
governing immigrants and immigration are unlawful because
they are preempted by Federal law. 8 Reaffirming the Federal
Government’s power over immigration, the Supreme Court
remarked that “[s]tate laws which impose discriminatory
burdens upon the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully
within the United States conflict with this constitutionally
derived federal power to regulate immigration, and have
accordingly been held invalid.”9 More recently, the Federal
Government again argued that a state unlawfully preempted
Federal power by designing and implementing its own laws
dealing with immigration within the state. For primarily that
reason, Arizona’s controversial anti-immigration legislation,
S.B. 1070, has been enjoined.10
Recent studies show that nearly eleven million
immigrants may be living in the United States without
documentation.11 Immigrations and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), a division of the Department of Homeland Security,
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faced with an overwhelming task and caseload, has sought
alternative means to achieve their objective of “enforce[ing]
federal laws governing border control, customs, trade and
immigration.”12 Over the past decade, increasing numbers
of state and local law enforcement agencies have begun to
collaborate with the federal government to enforce federal
immigration law.
Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) of 1952 through the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 199613 to
facilitate more rigorous enforcement of immigration laws.
In particular, section 287(g) of IIRIRA authorizes the federal
government to enter into Memorandums of Agreement
(MOAs) with state and local law enforcement agencies, so
that local police can help enforce Federal immigration law.
In response to the positive reception of 287(g) by state and
local law enforcement agencies, ICE created the Ofﬁce of
State and Local Coordination (OSLC) in 2007. OSLC builds
and maintains a handful of programs, collectively known as
“ACCESS” (Agreements of Cooperation in Communities
to Enhance Safety and Security), which equip local law
enforcement agents with a wealth of tools to enforce federal
immigration law.14 The Secure Communities initiative falls
under ACCESS’s umbrella of programs through which local
law enforcement agencies can help with federal immigration
enforcement. Congress further amended sections 274 and
276 of the INA to give state and local law enforcement agents
express authority to enforce the prohibition of “smuggling,
transporting, or harboring of illegal immigrants” and to
establish “criminal penalties for illegal reentry following
deportation.”15
Similar to efforts of the Legislature, throughout
the George W. Bush Administration, the Executive branch
ramped up efforts to utilize local law enforcement ofﬁcials
in enforcing immigration law. In 2002, Attorney General
Ashcroft issued a memorandum stating that the Department
of Justice was mistaken in asserting that local ofﬁcers did
not have the power to enforce civil immigration violations
(e.g., overstaying a visa).16 Ashcroft’s memo stipulated that
local ofﬁcers have “inherent authority” to make immigration
arrests based on violation of civil immigration laws.17 The
notion that local law enforcement maintains this “inherent
authority” has been a powerful tool for law enforcement
agencies attempting to substantiate their role as immigration
enforcers. This language has never been written into federal
regulation, and the actual legal weight of this memo is
debated.18
In increasing numbers, ICE has signed MOAs
with local law enforcement agencies, giving state and local
law enforcement ofﬁcers authority and responsibility to
enforce immigration laws within the normal course of their
duties.19 Although law enforcement ofﬁcers must undergo
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sensitivity training under 287(g) agreements, and should
make complaint procedures available in various languages,
myriad problems remain: prominent racial proﬁling; chilling
effect on Latino/a communities; lack of oversight and
accountability; potential infringement of constitutional
rights and denial of due process.20
a. About Secure Communities
Although local law enforcement ofﬁcers have been
increasingly involved in helping ICE identify and remove
criminal aliens, Secure Communities takes the localization
of immigration enforcement to a new level. Under
287(g)/ACCESS programs, local police ofﬁcers train with
immigration enforcement to implement federal immigration
laws by checking immigration status of individuals
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stopped on the street or brought into jail.21 Under Secure
Communities, local law enforcement ofﬁcers (not trained
by federal immigration enforcement ofﬁcers) are authorized
to send the ﬁngerprints of all individuals charged with, but
not yet convicted of crime to ICE, enabling cross-checking
mechanisms with the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) immigration database and the FBI criminal history
database.22 If the ﬁngerprints match a DHS or FBI record,
ICE is automatically notiﬁed, even if the individual has
never been convicted of a crime.23 Local police can hold an
individual suspected of being in the country illegally for 48
hours, until ICE arrives to take him or her into custody.24
To achieve its goals, Secure Communities uses
a three-tiered priority list for detaining and removing the
most dangerous and high-risk criminal aliens. Level 1, the
top priority, is to apprehend violent offenders: murderers,
rapists, kidnappers, and major drug offenders.25 The Level
2 priority is to identify and remove individuals convicted
of minor drug offenses and property offenses such as
21

burglary, larceny, fraud, and money laundering.26 Level 3
represents the lowest priority of aliens to detain and deport
and includes individuals who commit “public disorder” and
minor trafﬁc violations, such as driving without a license, or
running a stop sign.27 Level 3 also includes the catch-all, “all
others” arrested for other minor offenses.28
The program falls short, however, of meeting its
projected goal of “Identifying and Removing Dangerous
Threats to [the] Community.”29 In 2009, ICE data showed
that, of the 111,000 aliens successfully identiﬁed and detained
through the Secure Communities program, approximately
11,000 (10%) were charged with or convicted of “Level 1”
crimes; meanwhile, the other 90% of aliens identiﬁed and
detained were charged with or convicted of lesser crimes, and
not necessarily “dangerous threats” to their communities.30
Nearly half of those currently detained in immigration
detention have no criminal convictions at all.31 Moreover,
ﬁve to six percent of those identiﬁed and detained through
Secure Communities are mistakenly identiﬁed as aliens,
when they are actually U.S. citizens.32
Although the Secure Communities program was
ﬁrst introduced under the Bush Administration, it has
expanded rapidly during the Obama Administration.33 As
of July 20, 2010, it was activated in 467 jurisdictions in
twenty-six states.34 By September 28, 2010, the program
was activated in 658 jurisdictions in thirty-two states.35 It
is activated in all Virginia jurisdictions, and in four out of
twenty-four counties in Maryland. The District of Columbia
has refused police department attempts to implement the
program. ICE hopes to make the program available in
every state by 2011,36 and in effect nation-wide by 2013.37
As the program grows, political debate surrounding the
controversial program continues.
b. Problems with Secure Communities
i.

Prominent Racial Proﬁling

Although ICE maintains that the goal of the Secure
Communities program is to identify and remove dangerous
criminal aliens, it effectively serves as a green-light for local
law enforcement agencies to use racial proﬁling tactics to
target Latino individuals they suspect to be undocumented
immigrants.38 Once a law enforcement ofﬁcer ﬁnds a
pretext to arrest someone, the police ofﬁcer can bring the
arrested individual to the station for ﬁngerprinting. When
all ﬁngerprints are immediately sent to ICE and the FBI for
immigration enforcement cross-checking, it matters very
little what the purpose of the initial arrest was, and whether
the arrest ever led to a criminal conviction. Police ofﬁcers
motivated to rid their communities of Latino immigrants
not only have an avenue to do so, but because their motives
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are never monitored or questioned, they are given nearly
limitless power to enforce federal immigration law.
ii. Chilling Effect on Latino/a Communities
If police use the Secure Communities program
as an excuse to identify and deport immigrants, fewer
immigrants will feel comfortable calling the police to report
criminal activity. Alienating a subset of a community, and,
in urban neighborhoods, a very substantial percentage of
the community, frustrates the goals and purposes of law
enforcement. Police will have less information regarding
the whereabouts of individuals involved in actual criminal
activity, because when some community members feel
targeted and vulnerable, they stop cooperating with local
police, making the entire community less safe.
iii. Lack of Oversight and Accountability
A program, such as Secure Communities, wholly
designed by an administrative agency, has never received
legislative input as to speciﬁc procedures for oversight
or accountability. Indeed, ICE outlines priorities for the
Secure Communities program, but it is solely responsible
for ensuring that those priorities are met; if they are not
met, the impetus is on ICE alone to adjust its methods.
Furthermore, besides the initial agreements between
ICE and local law enforcement agencies, ICE has shown
no indication that it intends to train or monitor local law
enforcement in anti-racial proﬁling practices when utilizing
Secure Communities. Consequently, local law enforcement
agents are free to use their increased power without
supervisory guidance or interference. Finally, ICE has
been exceedingly reluctant to publish data regarding how
effective the program has been in achieving its purported
goals. The program was launched in October of 2008, but
ICE only recently, after various Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) requests and complaints ﬁled by advocacy
groups suspicious of foul play, acquiesced and published
data on the number of arrests connected to the program,
the type of criminal records of aliens identiﬁed through the
program, and the number of individuals deported through
Secure Communities. Despite access to this information,
many questions remain unanswered.
iv. Potential Infringement of Constitutional
Rights and Denial of Due Process
Because the Secure Communities program
implicitly condones the use of racial proﬁling (and racial
discrimination) to achieve its goals, the program must be
examined through a

THE MODERN AMERICAN

constitutional lens to ensure the protection of fundamental
rights. If the program is not narrowly tailored to achieve a
speciﬁc and permissible government purpose, the program’s
inherent discrimination violates the Equal Protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Secure Communities is not
narrowly tailored to suit its purported goal; in fact, it is not
tailored in the least. It encourages checking the immigration
status of all persons accused and arrested of crimes, even
where criminal charges are never pressed and individuals are
never convicted. The vast majority of aliens identiﬁed and
removed through the program have never been convicted
of a dangerous crime, or never been convicted of any crime
at all. What is worse, about 5% of the database “hits”
through the Secure Communities program identify United
States Citizens, not criminal aliens.
Furthermore, as many immigration law scholars
note, what was once considered a non-punitive consequence
of a civil infraction, immigration detention and deportation
are increasingly likened to criminal punishment.39 As the
consequences of civil immigration violations become
more severe, many argue that individuals involved in the
immigration system should be afforded more substantial
due process rights, like in the criminal system. Without
such procedural safeguards, our government runs the risk
of embodying an unfortunate hypocrisy, glorifying the
protection of liberty and freedom at all costs by ensuring
proper due process before convicting and punishing the
accused, while simultaneously denying such due process and
enforcing severe judgments on others accused, on the basis
of immigration status.
c.

Community Tension

Many advocates of Secure Communities base their
support on anti-terrorism efforts.40 Bringing to light the
fact that some of the 9/11 terrorists had been stopped for
minor trafﬁc violations before the infamous plane hijacking,
some argue that if local police ofﬁcers had access to Secure
Communities technology at the time, the suspects may
have been identiﬁed earlier as criminal aliens, and could
have been taken into custody and placed in deportation
proceedings.41 According to some, if Secure Communities
had been implemented more broadly, and earlier, the entire
devastating terrorist attack could have been averted, and
the lives of thousands of innocent people could have
been saved.42 Utah Republican Senator Orrin Hatch even
proposed legislative amendments to immigration law
that would require all localities to sign on to either 287(g)
programs or Secure Communities.43
Proponents of Secure Communities in Ohio praise
the program as a tool to help identify dangerous criminals
that would otherwise go undetected. Butler County Sherriff
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Rick Jones attested, “[i]t’s really a heaven-sent for us. [. . .
] I don’t want [criminal aliens] in my community, I’ve got
enough homegrown criminals here.”44 Indeed, as traditional
methods of law enforcement fail to target immigrant
criminals speciﬁcally, Secure Communities helps differentiate
between American citizen criminals and immigrants. For
law enforcement ofﬁcials seeking to rid their localities of
criminal aliens, the goals of Secure Communities certainly
align with their own.
Similarly, in Virginia, Fairfax County Sheriff Stan
Barry remarked that the Secure Communities program
was “a win-win situation both for the community and law
enforcement.”45 Barry boasts, “[w]e will be able to identify
illegal immigrants who commit crimes in Fairfax County
and get them in the process for deportation, and it does not
require additional funds or manpower from us.”46 Indeed,
Fairfax County will be able to identify undocumented
immigrants much sooner in the criminal process, without
needing to speciﬁcally recruit, employ, or train special teams
of law enforcement to deal exclusively with immigration
enforcement. Still, despite Barry’s contention that the
program will not cost Virginia taxpayers money, the State is
in the process of building the largest immigration detention
center in the Mid-Atlantic, a $21 million project that hopes
to house up to 1,000 immigrant detainees by next year.47
In contrast, opponents of Secure Communities argue
that the program ultimately will result in communities being
less safe. Noting that Secure Communities enforcement has
not resulted in signiﬁcant deportation of violent or dangerous
criminals, CASA de Maryland Attorney, Enid Gonzalez,
remarked that although the Program “claims to keep violent
criminals off the streets, [ . . .] it’s just incarcerating innocent
busboys.”48 Furthermore, many advocates worry that the
program has a chilling effect on Latino members of the
community, dissuading them from coming forward as crime
victims and witnesses, and thereby enabling actual criminals
to continue terrorizing the community. An opponent of
Secure Communities in Utah, Police Chief Chris Burbank
recognized this problem in his own community of Salt Lake
City: “Fighting crime without the help of one’s community
[ . . . ] is like trying to disarm a hidden mine by stomping on
the ground. By the time you have found the problem, it is
already too late.”49
Opponents in Virginia argue that the State unjustly
instituted the Program without the approval or consent of
the local government. Although Secure Communities is most
frequently enacted through individual agreements between
localities and ICE, Virginia recently implemented Secure
Communities state-wide, leaving many immigrants’ rights
advocates in Arlington arguing that it was unfairly instituted,
since the agreements had not been negotiated with Arlington
law enforcement, or Arlington County government.50
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Raising the level of confusion about the implementation
and possible dissolution of Secure Communities, ICE ﬁrst
announced there are no opt-out options, but then later
explained that despite discouragement, cities could opt out.51
ICE Deputy Press Secretary has stated that localities like
Arlington cannot opt-out of the program through ICE,
rather, the locality must settle the matter with the state
government.52 Oddly, in a letter dated September 8, 2010,
Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano explained
to Representative Zoe Lofgren that local jurisdictions could
opt-out by formally notifying the Assistant Director for
the Secure Communities Program.53 In early November
2010, ICE ofﬁcials met with Arlington County ofﬁcials,
and informed them that “local activated communities do
not have the option of withholding information from the
[Secure Communities] program.”54
San Francisco’s Sherriff repeatedly attempted
to opt-out of California’s growing implementation of
Secure Communities.55 His appeal was denied by the
State Attorney General,56 but San Francisco advocates
persisted, searching for ways to escape the implementation
of Secure Communities. On September 1, 2010, after two
years of dedicated advocacy by Immigrants’ rights groups
and Sherriff Michael Hennessey, ICE ﬁnally announced a
procedure for local jurisdictions to request to opt-out of
Secure Communities.57 Angela Chan, an attorney at the
Asian Law Caucus acknowledged the potential impact this
recent announcement may make:
It’s a promising development that ICE
has ﬁnally come out and acknowledged
that the program is voluntary in a written
statement. The next step is for ICE to
follow through and allow San Francisco
to opt out since both our Sheriff and our
Board of Supervisors have clearly stated
our city’s request to opt out.58
Similarly, attorneys and advocates in Arlington, Virginia
have fervently lobbied state legislators to permit the county
to opt-out of the program.59 After indications that optingout was possible,60 the Arlington County Board voted to
withdraw from Secure Communities.61
Whether jurisdictions feasibly can opt-out continues
to be unclear. After Arlington announced its intention to
opt-out, a senior ICE ofﬁcial explained to the Washington
Post:
The only way a local jurisdiction could opt
out of the program is if a state refused to
send ﬁngerprints to the FBI. Since police
and prosecutors need to know the criminal
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histories of people they arrest, it is not
realistic for states to withhold ﬁngerprints
from the FBI, which means it is impossible
to withhold them from ICE.62
In early October 2010, in stark contrast to its declaration
one month earlier, ICE announced that local governments
would not be able to opt-out of the program.63 ICE
Director John Morton conceded that “the agency would
meet with the localities to discuss the issue, but in the end
the agreement is with the state.”64 After meeting with ICE
ofﬁcials on November 5, 2010, Arlington County Manager
Barbara Donnellan explained to the rest of the County
Board, “ICE stated that Secure Communities is a federal
information-sharing program which links two federal
ﬁngerprint databases. . . . The program does not require state
and local law enforcement to partner with ICE in enforcing
federal law.”65 Whether local jurisdictions will be free to
opt-out remains to be deﬁnitively explained to confused law
enforcement and government ofﬁcials nation-wide.
As the debate grows, and immigrants’ rights groups
advocate for the end of the Secure Communities program,
the concern of whether and how the program infringes
upon the rights of immigrants becomes more ubiquitous.
Although immigrants to the United States do not enjoy
all of the Constitutional rights as American citizens, the
courts have held that immigrants enjoy some Constitutional
protection. As such, the Secure Communities program
may need careful scrutiny to determine whether it satisﬁes
Constitutional precedent.
II. Immigrants’ Rights
In determining whether constitutional rights extend
to immigrants, courts have frequently considered whether the
framers of the Constitution would have meant for terms like
“persons,” “people,” and “citizens,” to include immigrants.
If the terms were intended to include immigrants, which
immigrants should be included? Most often, whether
constitutional rights are afforded to immigrants depends on
their status.
Some rights guaranteed to United States citizens
have rarely been afforded to immigrants, and have rarely been
contested. For example, interpretations of the Constitution
dating back to the early 1800s indicate that aliens were not
included in “the people of the several states” who enjoyed
the right to vote.66 Voting was considered a privilege, or
at most, a “political right,” subject to the discretion of the
State.67 In United States v. Esparaza-Mendoza, the Supreme
Court determined in 1874 that “citizenship has not in all
cases been made a condition precedent to the enjoyment
of the right of suffrage.”68 However, scholars note that
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un-naturalized alien immigrants were not ofﬁcially excluded
from suffrage until 1928.69 The conclusion that immigrants
are not included in “the people of the several states” has
left the door open to the determination that immigrants are
excluded from several other Constitutional protections as
well.
a. Equal Protection
Despite being denied the right to vote, immigrants
are afforded some constitutional rights. Plyler v. Doe ensured
that immigrants are protected under the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 70 In Plyler, a group
of undocumented Mexican children sought declaratory and
injunctive relief against a Texas statute that excluded them
from access to free education at state public schools.71 The
Supreme Court struck down the statute, noting that even
though the children had not been “legally admitted” to the
United States, discrimination against them on the basis of
their immigration status was impermissible because the
State did not establish a rational basis sufﬁcient to deny the
beneﬁt of public education.72 Reﬂecting on the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment, “No State shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws[,]”73 the court held that “an alien is surely a ‘person’ in
any ordinary sense of that term.”74 Because undocumented
alien children are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, a
law discriminating against them on the basis of immigration
status violated their Constitutional right to Equal Protection
because, although conserving the state’s ﬁnancial resources
may be a legitimate government interest, the law was not
narrowly tailored enough to advance such an interest.75
Even facially neutral laws have been found to
violate the Equal Protection clause if they are applied
in a racially discriminatory manner against immigrants.
In the 1880s, many Chinese citizens immigrated to the
Western United States and opened small businesses. A
San Francisco ordinance gave the San Francisco Board
of Supervisors the power to oversee and authorize the
opening and maintenance of laundromats, particularly
laundromats in wooden buildings. Although the ordinance
was not discriminatory on its face, the custom of the Board
of Supervisors was to deny laundry permits to Chinese
laundry shop owners. The Supreme Court held in Yick Wo
v. Hopkins that the arbitrary and discriminatory practices
of the Board of Supervisors, effectively barring Chinese
immigrants from the entire profession of owning and
operating laundromats, constituted racial discrimination and
therefore infringed upon the Constitutional rights of Chinese
immigrant applicants.76 The court noted that, “[t]he rights
of the petitioners . . . are not less because they are aliens
and subjects of the emperor of China.”77 Reﬂecting upon
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protections ensured by the Constitution, in invalidating the
local ordinance, the Supreme Court stated:
[I]f, by an ordinance general in its terms
and form, like the one in question, by
reserving an arbitrary discretion in the
enacting body to grant or deny permission
to engage in a proper and necessary calling,
a discrimination against any class can be
made in its execution, thereby evading and
in effect nullifying the provisions of the
national constitution, then the insertion of
provisions to guard the rights of every class
and person in that instrument was a vain
and futile act.78
In invalidating the San Francisco ordinance, the court
held that the Equal Protection clause applied universally
to all people, without regard to race, color, or nationality.79
Indeed, the Supreme Court recently reinforced the notion
that laws based on alienage or immigration status be subject
to a higher level of judicial scrutiny.80 As such, “the power
of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants
as a class is conﬁned within narrow limits.”81
b. Confusion, Abridgement and Reinforcement of Immigrants’
Rights
In the years since Yick Wo, Constitutional rights
afforded to immigrants have been substantially abridged.
Indeed, as the court in Mathews v. Diaz noted, “[i]n the exercise
of its broad power over naturalization and immigration,
Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable
if applied to citizens.”82
In 1904, John Turner, an Irish citizen and immigrant
to the United States, ﬁled a writ of habeas corpus after
his detention and the commencement of deportation
proceedings. Turner was a self-proclaimed anarchist, and
the 1903 Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into
the United States prohibited anarchists from entering the
country.83 Many later courts have co-opted one famous
line of dicta from Turner, in order to further deny rights to
immigrants: “[An alien] does not become one of the people
to whom these things are secured by our Constitution by
an attempt to enter, forbidden by law.”84 The Supreme
Court held that the 1903 Act was not an unconstitutional
abridgment of First Amendment rights; the First
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech did not extend to an
alien anarchist, particularly when his entry into the country
was prohibited by an act of Congress.85
Similarly, in 1945, an Australian citizen and
immigrant to the United States ﬁled a writ of habeas corpus
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appealing his detention and imminent deportation after he
was determined to be afﬁliated with the Communist party in
violation of an amendment to the Immigration Act of 1917.86
Unlike Turner, however, the court determined that Bridges’
“isolated instances”87 of afﬁliation with the Communist party
did not necessitate his immediate deportation. Somewhat
confusingly, the court asserted that aliens residing within
the United States are afforded Constitutional protections of
freedom of speech and freedom of press.88 In reversing
the Circuit court’s dismissal of Bridges’ habeas petition, the
court reiterated that,
although deportation technically is not
criminal punishment . . . it may nevertheless
visit as great a hardship as the deprivation
of the right to pursue a vocation or a
calling. . . . As stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis
. . . deportation may result in the loss ‘of all
that makes life worth living’.89
As such, procedures involving such a deprivation must
“meet the essential standards of fairness.”90 The court
determined that the lower courts misconstrued the deﬁnition
of “afﬁliation” when considering Bridges’ relationship to
the communist party, and therefore his detention under the
deportation order was indeed unlawful. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Murphy remarked famously upon the
importance of safeguarding Constitutional rights:
The record in this case will stand forever as
a monument to man’s intolerance of man.
Seldom if ever in the history of this nation
has there been such a concentrated and
relentless crusade to deport an individual
because he dared to exercise the freedom that
belongs to him as a human being and that is
guaranteed to him by the Constitution.91 .
. . [T]he Constitution has been more than
a silent, anemic witness to this proceeding.
It has not stood idly by while one of its
subjects is being excommunicated from
this nation without the slightest proof
that his presence constitutes a clear and
present danger to the public welfare. Nor
has it remained aloof while this individual
is being deported, resulting in the loss
‘of all that makes life worth living,’ . . . .
When the immutable freedoms guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights have been so openly
and concededly ignored, the full wrath of
constitutional condemnation descends
upon the action taken by the Government.
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And only by expressing that wrath can we
give form and substance to ‘the great, the
indispensable democratic freedoms,’ to
which this nation is dedicated.92
Although seemingly progressive and forwardthinking, Justice Murphy’s remarks have been used to both
bolster the rights of lawfully present immigrants, and to deny
Constitutional rights to undocumented immigrants. Justice
Murphy recognized the limitations of the Constitution,
noting that “[s]ince an alien obviously brings with him no
constitutional rights,” Congress may enact laws excluding
him or her as it sees ﬁt.93 Murphy reasoned, “once an
alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes
invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to
all people within our borders . . . [including] the First and
the Fifth Amendments and by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”94
In 1982, the Supreme Court seemingly deﬁed earlier
case law regarding the Constitutional rights of immigrants
when it found valid a California statute requiring United
States citizenship for employment as a government ofﬁcer.
The court explained that,
[t]he exclusion of aliens from basic
governmental processes is not a deﬁciency
in the democratic system but a necessary
consequence of the community’s process
of political self-deﬁnition. Self-government
. . . begins by deﬁning the scope of the
community of the governed and thus of the
governors as well: Aliens are by deﬁnition
those outside of this community.95
The exclusion of aliens from the deﬁnition of community
stands in contrast to prior declarations that aliens are
included within the deﬁnition of “people” protected under
the Constitution.96
Diverging interpretations of whether immigrants
should be afforded Constitutional protections continue to
result in differing and sometimes conﬂicting case law. A
recent local case in a Virginia circuit court held that an
undocumented immigrant was barred from bringing a
workers’ compensation claim against his employer.97 The
court determined that, although Virginia code deﬁned
“employee” as “every person, including aliens and minors, in
the service of another under any contract of hire . . . whether
lawfully or unlawfully employed[,]” an undocumented
immigrant could not be included in that deﬁnition “without
subverting federal immigration policy.”98 Relief like worker’s
compensation “is foreclosed by federal immigration policy,
as expressed by Congress in the Immigration Reform and
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Control Act of 1986.”99
Looking back, the Plyler decision may have been
either an aberration on a historical tradition of denying
rights to immigrants, or it may be a turning point towards
broader assurance of rights for aliens in the United States.
While some immigrants are afforded Constitutional and
other legal protections, others are excluded due to various
interpretations of “person,” “people,” “employee,” and
even “immigrant.” Still, precedent set by Plyler assures that
all immigrants (documented and undocumented alike) are
protected by the Equal Protection clause. Considering both
the broad power of Congress with respect to immigration,
and the rights that immigrants maintain under the
Constitution, is Secure Communities a permissible exercise
of government power?
III. Secure Communities: An Equal Protection
Analysis
A law violates the Equal Protection clause when
it denies a beneﬁt to a discrete class of people while it is
afforded to others similarly situated. In analyzing the
constitutionality of a law under Equal Protection, a court
will ﬁrst determine what level of scrutiny must be applied.
A law is presumed valid unless a challenger shows that the
law in question falls within exceptions to this presumption:
if the law infringes upon a fundamental right; if the law
distorts the political process; if the law targets a racial or
religious minority; or if the law targets another “discrete
and insular minority.”100
The next step in an Equal Protection analysis is
discerning whether the law seeks to achieve a permissible
government purpose. If the purported goal of the law is
impermissible, it fails an Equal Protection review, and is
unconstitutional. However, the actual purpose of a law
may differ from its purported goal. If the actual purpose
of a law is impermissible, it also fails an Equal Protection
review, and is unconstitutional. If the government purpose
is legitimate, the ﬁnal step is to determine whether the law is
related to the achievement of its goal.
a. What Level of Scrutiny Should be Applied?
For the purposes of an Equal Protection challenge,
a law is presumed valid, and subject to rational basis review,
unless a challenger can show either that the beneﬁt denied
is a fundamental right, or that individuals denied the beneﬁt
are part of a discrete or suspect class.101 If the beneﬁt denied
is a fundamental right, the court will review the questionable
law or practice with strict scrutiny. If the law discriminately
affords the beneﬁt, and denies it to a group of individuals
on the basis of race or religion, the court similarly applies
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strict scrutiny review. However, if the law denies a beneﬁt
on the basis of legitimate differences between differentiated
classes, or the characteristic upon which the discrimination
is based is not an immutable characteristic, the court
may apply an intermediate level of review, less stringent
than strict scrutiny, but more stringent than rational basis
review.102 Although discrimination on the basis of race
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and national origin are afforded strict scrutiny review,
discrimination on the basis of immigration status is analyzed
under intermediate scrutiny.104 Immigration status is largely
considered a voluntary condition, and therefore not an
immutable characteristic.105 Still, immigrants are a discrete
and vulnerable class, and often the target of discrimination.
While laws analyzed under rational basis review are given
much deference, and only rarely overturned, laws evaluated
under intermediate review or strict scrutiny are subject to a
higher standard; as such, they are examined more critically
to determine if the discrimination in question is sufﬁciently
invidious to be deemed unconstitutional.
According to Plyler, although immigrants are a
discrete class of individuals, and frequently discriminated
against, their status is at least partly voluntary (and not
immutable); therefore, their Equal Protection claim may
be subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny. One could
argue that the immigration status of most undocumented
immigrants is involuntary because there are few and nearimpossible legal avenues for an undocumented immigrant
to adjust his/her status. Furthermore, many individuals
faced with poverty, political persecution, or gang violence
in their home country, feel as though they have no choice
but to immigrate to the United States. Still, some would
argue that, albeit an unappealing choice between remaining
in the United States undocumented or returning to one’s
country of origin, the fact that an individual chooses to
remain in the United States without documentation is
evidence of his/her voluntarily determined status; therefore
an Equal Protection claim would require an analysis under
intermediate scrutiny.
b. Permissible Government Purpose
i.

Purported Purpose

Does the Secure Communities program seek to
achieve a permissible government goal? ICE’s purported
goals of Secure Communities are to identify aliens in law
enforcement custody, prioritize apprehending and removing
criminal aliens who pose the greatest threat to public safety,
and efﬁciently identify, process and remove criminal aliens
from the United States.106
First, identifying aliens in law enforcement
custody may be problematic. Although deportation was
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always considered a civil penalty, the current process and
consequences of deportation make the reality of deportation
more like criminal punishment.107 If deportation is more akin
to a criminal punishment, aliens in custody should be given
proper due process, including notice, an opportunity to be
heard, and an opportunity to contest charges against them,
before punishment is exacted. Identifying, apprehending
and removing criminal aliens from the United States may
be a permissible goal for the federal government, but is it
a permissible responsibility for localities? Surely efﬁciency
in the process of identifying and removing criminal
aliens should be a permissible government goal, but is it
permissible to delegate this power to localities, and require
locality compliance? It is likely permissible if localities optin to the program on their own accord, but ICE expects to
have the Secure Communities program in effect nation-wide
by 2013.108 Requiring states and localities to enforce federal
law is a violation of the Tenth Amendment.109 If Secure
Communities deﬁes the Tenth Amendment by unlawfully
forcing state participation in the enforcement of federal
law, it will have an impermissible goal and will consequently
violate Equal Protection principles as well.
ii. Actual Purpose
Where a facially-neutral law has a dubiously
impermissible actual purpose, the court will take into account
the actual purpose in analyzing whether the law violates the
Equal Protection clause. However, the court most often
defers to decisions of the legislature where the level of
scrutiny is not heightened.110 If the impermissible outcome
of the law is simply an unintended effect, a law may not
necessarily be invalidated for having an impermissible
purpose. However, if the court determines that a law has
an impermissible intended purpose, despite being facially
neutral, the court may invalidate it for violating Equal
Protection.111
ICE maintains that the actual purpose of Secure
Communities is to ensure community safety by removing
dangerous criminal aliens. However, ICE’s own statistics
show that the majority of those identiﬁed and removed
through Secure Communities have been Level 2 and Level
3 offenders.112 Indeed, only 8-10% of those identiﬁed
through the program are Level 1 offenders, those speciﬁcally
targeted as dangerous and high-risk threats. Interestingly,
the number of Level 1 offenders is only slightly higher than
the number of U.S. citizens who are identiﬁed as a “hit”
through the Secure Communities program (5%).113
Speciﬁc data on the race and national origin
of individuals identiﬁed and deported through Secure
Communities is seriously lacking, and is the subject of both
FOIA investigations and complaints.114 If this speciﬁc data
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were published, it may very likely show that the overwhelming
majority of individuals identiﬁed through the program are
Latino. Although the program does not overtly require
discrimination on the basis of race, its intended effect is to
remove as many Latino immigrants from the United States
as possible. If this were the case, the program would fail an
Equal Protection challenge, for promoting an impermissible
government objective.
c.

Ends and Means Nexus
i.

How Closely Should the Program Fit its
Purported Goals?

Assuming that an analyzing court determines that
the purpose of the Secure Communities program is not
dubious, but rather a permissible government goal, how
broad or narrow must be program be tailored to remain
constitutionally valid under Equal Protection? Under a
rational basis review, a law challenged under Equal Protection
must be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.
It is unlikely that Secure Communities, a program highly
contested for its overwhelming reliance on racial proﬁling,
would be subject to such a low level of constitutional review.
If Secure Communities were analyzed under rational basis
review, because the court pays high deference to existing
laws and administrative programs, Secure Communities
would likely be found constitutionally permissible.
Under strict scrutiny review, a challenged program
is presumed invalid. In order to remain valid, the program
must be necessary to achieve a compelling government
purpose. Under intermediate scrutiny review, a challenged
program must be narrowly tailored to achieve an important
government goal. If ICE’s important government goal
is prioritizing the identiﬁcation and removal of criminal
aliens, it may need to clarify the deﬁnition of a “criminal
alien.” If violating a civil immigration law is not a crime,
undocumented aliens who have never been convicted
of criminal offenses would not be “criminal aliens,” and
therefore would not be reached by the Secure Communities
program. If this is the case, the fact that some non-criminal
undocumented workers have been removed under the Secure
Communities program may constitute prima facie evidence
that the government’s program is not sufﬁciently tailored
to meet its goal. It is unlawfully over-inclusive, catching
in its net far more individuals than it purports to identify
and deport. If the program is too broad in attempting to
achieve its purported goal, it may be an unconstitutional
violation of Equal Protection.
ii. Negative Externalities and Policy Concern
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If the goal of Secure Communities is to promote
safety, it is deeply and ironically ﬂawed since a troubling
consequence of Secure Communities is its profound chilling
effect on immigrants with respect to reporting crimes.
Concerned about their potential vulnerability to inquiries
about immigration status, fewer immigrants who are crime
witnesses or victims will come forward to the authorities.115
Increased reluctance to report criminal activity can only
result in insecure communities, where criminals remain free
to commit more crimes.
Additionally, although ICE admitted that 5% of
individuals identiﬁed through the Program are U.S. citizens,
it never mentioned how many of those identiﬁed were
Lawful Permanent Residents. ICE’s data fails to include
how often U.S. Citizens or Lawful Permanent Residents
were arrested, ﬁngerprinted, identiﬁed, and detained by
ICE as a result of Secure Communities. The Supreme
Court cautioned against imposing substantial burdens on
lawful immigrants, because “our traditional policy [is] not
treating aliens as a thing apart.”116 Highlighting Congress’s
role in speciﬁcally regulating immigration, the Court held
that the purpose of immigration regulation is to “protect
the personal liberties of law-abiding aliens . . . and to leave
them free from the possibility of inquisitorial practices
and police surveillance.”117 Because Secure Communities
effectively facilitates removals for many individuals who,
though arrested and ﬁngerprinted, have never have been
convicted of a crime, the Program inherently stands in stark
contrast to the Supreme Court’s mandate of leaving lawabiding aliens free from invasive police practices.
Furthermore, the Secure Communities program
relies heavily on racial proﬁling to achieve its goal of
identifying and removing alien immigrants. The practice of
racial proﬁling alone is problematic because it perpetuates
negative stereotypes and bias-related crime against
individuals on the basis of their skin color. Furthermore,
it makes already-vulnerable groups even more vulnerable to
discrimination and socio-economic oppression. It reinforces
despicable notions of inferiority, and deeply offends the
dignity of people of color, regarding both an individual’s
sense of self-worth and the presumptive social value of
such and individual in the community.118 As Justice Murphy
remarked in his dissent in Korematsu v. United States,
giv[ing] constitutional sanction to that
inference [that race could be used as a
proxy for criminal suspicion] . . . is to adopt
one of the cruelest of the rationales used
by our enemies to destroy the dignity of
the individual and to encourage and open
the door to discriminatory actions against
other minority groups in the passions of
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tomorrow.119
More recently, Justice Goldberg, reﬂecting upon the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, emphasized the importance of
protecting the dignity of individuals discriminated against
on the basis of race: “Discrimination is not simply dollars
and cents, hamburgers and movies; it is the humiliation,
frustration, and embarrassment that a person must surely
feel when he is told that he is unacceptable as a member of
the public because of his race or color.”120
Governmental utilization of racial proﬁling
programs serves to aggravate these issues. Condoning
racial proﬁling tactics is not only unethical, but may soon
be explicitly unlawful as well.121 Considering the multitude
of negative externalities of Secure Communities program,
Congress must speciﬁcally address the program, and local
governments must reconsider their involvement in the
enforcement of federal immigration law.
IV. The Future of Secure Communities
a. Litigation Against Secure Communities
In February 2010, the National Day Laborer
Organizing Network, Center for Constitutional Rights, and
Immigration Justice Clinic of the Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law (the “Network”) ﬁled a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) request, to obtain data related to
the two-year old Secure Communities program.122 In late
April 2010, they commenced a lawsuit against ICE, DHS,
Executive Ofﬁce for Immigration Review, the FBI, and
the Ofﬁce of Legal Counsel, for failing to release agency
records under the Freedom of Information Act.123 After
much delay, ICE and DHS reluctantly disclosed information
about the Secure Communities program, conﬁrming what
advocates at the Network feared: the Program functions
as a “dragnet,” funneling individuals into a highly ﬂawed
detention and removal system; 79% of those caught in
the Program’s net are not criminals or were picked up for
minor offenses; the Program serves as a smokescreen for
racial proﬁling, allowing police ofﬁcers to make arrests that
could lead to deportations, rather than to convictions; and
although the Program is not mandatory, there is no clear
opt-out procedure.124 Although ICE complied with FOIA
requests, many of the questionable practices inherent in
Secure Communities remain. As such, it is likely that the
Network, or other like-minded advocacy organizations, will
continue to pursue litigation against ICE to remedy these
issues.
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b. Effect of Judicial Findings in United States v. Arizona
If Arizona’s SB 1070 withstands Constitutional
scrutiny, it may provide a dangerous foundation for racial
proﬁling and the expansion of Secure Communities. Like
Secure Communities, Arizona’s recent anti-immigration bill
has been the subject of much political debate. Both programs
involve delegating signiﬁcant responsibility to unsupervised
local law enforcement ofﬁcers, which implicates a grave
potential for racial proﬁling tactics to be tacitly enacted in
day-to-day policing.
The most prominent argument in the Federal
Government’s case against the State of Arizona regarding
Arizona’s anti-immigration law, SB 1070, is that the state
impermissibly attempts to preempt an area of law speciﬁcally
reserved for the Federal Government. Control over
immigration policy and enforcement, a clear responsibility
of the Federal Government,125 is reinforced by the Tenth
Amendment.126 However, considering the proliferation
of ICE programs that delegate signiﬁcant power in
immigration enforcement to localities, this argument may
no longer be persuasive. Arizona District Court Judge
Bolton granted a preliminary injunction against SB1070,127
concurring with the Federal Government’s argument that
Arizona unlawfully attempted to preempt Federal law, but
in the absence of clear Congressional discussion of ICE’s
current programs, and authority to delegate the power
of immigration enforcement, the Secure Communities
program may similarly be found to be an impermissible coopting of Federal authority. Furthermore, ICE’s attempt to
delegate its clearly federal responsibility to state and local
governments may violate the Tenth Amendment.128
c.

The Impact of Congressional Legislation: The End Racial
Proﬁling Act of 2010

Legislative efforts to end discrimination are evident
in HR 5748, also known as the End Racial Proﬁling Act
of 2010. The bill, introduced in Congress in July of 2010,
seeks to eliminate racial proﬁling by law enforcement by
giving individual victims of racial proﬁling a private right
of action to sue; by creating a disparate impact private
right of action; by requiring the Attorney General’s
oversight; and by requiring data collection and publication,
allowing the public to provide external oversight.129
If passed, this bill has the potential to change the
current state of immigration enforcement radically, and
ensure the liberty and dignity of all citizens, immigrants,
residents and visitors to the United States. Granting
individual victims of racial proﬁling a private right of
action to sue would force ICE and local law enforcement
to exercise discretion and care in routine practices. Rather
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than receiving measly declarative relief, victims may ﬁnally
witness unlawful government action being judicially
sanctioned. Rather than receiving apologies, victims would
receive ﬁnancial compensation. Additionally, allowing
a disparate impact private right of action ensures that
facially-neutral, or even unintentional discrimination is
avoided. Perhaps most signiﬁcantly, the bill would require
agencies like ICE to regularly publish data to show how its
program functions, and whether it is achieving its goals.
Making such data available to the public would force ICE
to be responsible for the way in which its programs are
executed. It would better equip advocacy organizations
to ensure that civil rights are not violated. The bill would
require steadfast and dedicated oversight to ensure that
racial proﬁling be eradicated. Still, although this bill would
deeply de-claw some of the problematic aspects of the
Secure Communities program, it would not rectify all of its
injustices.
d. Alternative Approaches to Immigration Enforcement
Rather than engaging in complicated, ad-hoc, noncongressionally authorized, federal-local collaborations
to identify and deport all undocumented immigrants, the
Federal government needs to re-examine and reinstate
comprehensive immigration reform, including just and fair
immigration enforcement. This reform should consider
why individuals come into the United States illegally. As
experts at the Migration Policy Institute point out, “our
immigration laws provide inadequate legal avenues to enter
the United States for employment purposes at levels that
our economy demands.”130
By issuing visas like the H1-A and H1-B, U.S.
Customs and Immigration Services grants temporary
legal status to immigrants coming to work in the United
States. Unfortunately, the government offers only 66,000
visas to individuals coming to work in low-skilled, nonagricultural settings inside the United States; this number
falls grossly below the number of people interested, and
actually performing this work.131 If the U.S. issued more
visas to low-skilled workers, more people would follow
legal avenues to obtain employment here. Furthermore,
because applying for and obtaining visas through family
members take many immigrants nearly a decade,132 there
is little incentive to follow government rules. Rather,
as experts note, immigrants and their employers follow
market rules.133
Indeed, changes in immigration enforcement
are an empty and fool-hardy attempt to solve what
is a tremendously decisive issue to all sides of the
contemporary political debate. Before reforming
immigration enforcement, the federal government

THE MODERN AMERICAN

ﬁrst needs to address much-needed reforms to federal
immigration policy.
e.

Local Advocacy Efforts Against Secure Communities

Rights Working Group (RWG) a group of
hundreds of progressive local, state and national
organizations, committed to protecting civil liberties and
human rights, spearheads two campaigns closely tied to
addressing and reforming recent changes in immigration
enforcement: Face the Truth (addressing racial proﬁling),
and Hold DHS Accountable (urging President Obama to
issue a moratorium on current immigration enforcement
policies that deny due process). In addition to supporting
pending legislation by the Network and the Center for
Constitutional Rights, RWG also worked closely with
Virginia-based attorneys in Arlington to investigate the
possibility of Arlington opting-out of the state-mandated
Secure Communities program. After Secretary Napolitano
announced to Congress that jurisdictions could opt-out,
the Arlington County Board voted to ofﬁcially withdraw
from participating in the program, despite Virginia’s statewide activation of Secure Communities.134 Despite this
seemingly successful event, the outcome of which remains
vague, Secure Communities continues to spread rapidly
across the country.
Conclusion
In the wake of Virginia Attorney General Ken
Cuccinelli’s recent opinion, authorizing law enforcement to
check the immigration status of anyone stopped by police
ofﬁcers for any reason, it is likely that local immigration
enforcement policies will be thrust further into the center
of political debate.135
Is Secure Communities Constitutional? Probably
not. The Supreme Court has held and reafﬁrmed that
immigrants constitute a discrete class of individuals,
worthy of at least an intermediate standard of review in an
Equal Protection claim. The program relies substantially
on racial proﬁling, and laws enabling or condoning racial
classiﬁcations are always strictly scrutinized by a reviewing
court. Considering the heightened level of scrutiny to
be applied, the program certainly is not narrowly tailored
enough to warrant deference. ICE’s own data proves
that Secure Communities broadly overreaches its goal
of identifying and removing dangerous criminal aliens;
nearly 80% of the immigrants removed through Secure
Communities since 2008 were neither dangerous, nor
criminals.
Too many people get caught up in popular
political fervor, repeating uninformed rhetoric without
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fully considering the realities of the debate. Despite our
embarrassing history of slavery, oppression and racism,
the United States has a strong history of protecting the
disenfranchised, impoverished, and vulnerable from
tyranny of an unrelenting majority.136 This nation was
founded upon the premise that all individuals, even the
politically unpopular, are free from persecution, and
afforded due process and equal protection of the laws.
However contentious this debate may be, considering the
high stakes of constitutional and human rights violations
at hand, legal advocacy cannot wait.
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CASTER SEMENYA AND THE MYTH OF A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
By: Erin Buzuvis 1

In August of 2009, policies and
procedures to verify the sex of female
athletes were called into question when
South African runner Caster Semenya
won the 800 meter event of the World
Championships in Berlin. Responding
to rumors of gender fraud, and fueled
by Semenya’s speed, musculature,
and deep voice, the International
Association of Athletics Federations
(IAAF) requested that Semenya
submit to sex veriﬁcation to conﬁrm
her eligibility for the women’s division.2
Some saw the suspicion cast on
Semenya as the product of intersecting
racism and sexism, namely, Semenya’s
failure to conform to standards of
white femininity and to stereotypes
about women’s inferior athleticism.
The scrutiny of Semenya’s personal
life is reportedly taking a heavy toll,
as evidenced by reports that she has
gone into hiding due to the distress
and embarrassment generated by the
controversy. Underscoring concerns
for Semenya’s emotional wellbeing are comparisons of Semenya
to Santhi Soundarajan, an Indian
runner who was stripped of her
silver medal in the 2006 Asia Games
after failing a sex test and was later
rumored to have attempted suicide.3
The IAAF did not publicize
its sex-veriﬁcation testing methods, but
according to its policy, an athlete whose
sex is challenged or raises suspicion can
be asked to submit to a multidimensional
medical evaluation conducted by a
panel comprised of a gynecologist,
endocrinologist, psychologist, internal
medicine specialist, and an “expert on
gender/transgender issues.”4 While
the IAAF will not ofﬁcially disclose
the results of these tests,5 unconﬁrmed
reports leaked to the media suggest
that Semenya has an intersex condition
related to the presence of internal testes
36

and testosterone levels that are higher
(perhaps three times higher) than those
of the average woman. In November
of 2009 the IAAF announced that
Semenya would not lose the gold medal
and prize money she won in Berlin.6
Shortly thereafter, the International
Olympic Committee (IOC) held a
conference but was not successful in
producing guidelines to help governing
bodies address the eligibility of athletes
with “disorders of sex development.”7
The IAAF recently cleared
Semenya to run in future events.8
Still, the conﬁdential nature of the
decision, coupled with a failure to
repudiate current policy allowing for
sex-veriﬁcation testing on a case-bycase basis, holds open the possibility
that the IAAF could disqualify other
athletes for failing a sex veriﬁcation
test, even without accompanying
evidence or a charge that the athlete
or her agents intentionally attempted
to deceive the sporting world as to
her sex. Similarly, the IOC allows

As long as we continue to organize
separate athletic contests for men and
women, athletes should be allowed to
participate in events consistent with their
bona ﬁde gender identity.
sex-veriﬁcation testing in response to
charges or suspicion that an athlete
competing in a women’s sport or
event is not physically eligible to do so.
Most recently, the Chinese organizers
of the 2008 summer Olympics in
Beijing boasted famously that a stateof-the-art sex veriﬁcation laboratory
would be available throughout the
games to run expedient sex tests
on “suspicious looking women.”9
The controversy surrounding
Caster Semenya’s sex provides a useful
touchstone for an analysis of sex-

veriﬁcation testing at the Olympic
level as well as within the IAAF. The
justiﬁcation for sex-veriﬁcation testing
incorporates
two
presumptions:
ﬁrst, that sex exists in a binary, and
second, that fairness in sport requires
a strict separation of the sexes. Once
both of these presumptions are
exposed as myths, it becomes clear
that attempts to medically police the
boundary between men’s and women’s
sports are futile and unwarranted.
As long as we continue to organize
separate athletic contests for men and
women, athletes should be allowed
to participate in events consistent
with their bona ﬁde gender identity.
I. IOC Policy on Sex Testing:
History and Current Practice
The ancient Olympic Games
excluded women from both participation
and attendance, due to fear that their
presence would usurp the strength
of Hercules, the hero and warrior in
whose honor the Games were held.10
Some historians consider enforced
nudity at the ancient games to be the
ﬁrst Olympic sex veriﬁcation policy.11
Female athletes have been
allowed to attend and participate in
the Olympic Games for most of the
modern Olympic era, but they have
been subject to sex scrutiny throughout
this time. During the Cold War, the
IOC required female athletes to submit
their bodies to visual inspections by
medical ofﬁcials. In 1968, the IOC
abandoned the “nude parades” in
favor of a less invasive and humiliating
chromosomal test on cells swabbed
from the lining of the athlete’s mouth.12
Until 1998, and subject to limited
exceptions, athletes were only allowed
to participate in women’s events if a
compulsory chromosomal sex testing
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conﬁrmed an XX genotype.13 Today, fact that she passed a visual inspection
such testing is not mandatory, but the year before.21 Twenty years later,
Olympic organizing committees (such another runner, Maria Jose Martinez
as in Beijing) and athletic federations Patino, discovered for the ﬁrst time
(such as the IAAF) may conduct during a sex veriﬁcation test that
testing on a case-by-case basis. she lacked a second X chromosome
The IOC has justiﬁed sex typical of most women.22 Patino,
veriﬁcation policies as necessary
to prevent men from cheating by
disguising themselves as women and the laboratory’s existence underscores
entering women’s athletic events.14 the fact that IOC policy would have
Yet there is only one known instance permitted sex-veriﬁcation testing to occur
in Olympic history of this actually
at the Olympic Games.
happening. In 1936, “Dora” Ratjen
of Germany ﬁnished fourth in the
women’s high jump.15 Twenty years who was encouraged to fake an injury
later, the athlete admitted that he was and withdraw quietly, was not a man
actually Hermann Ratjen, a former despite her XY chromosomes.23
Hitler Youth member whom the Nazis She had Androgen Insensitivity
had forced to compete as a woman.16 Syndrome (AIS), an inability to process
During the Cold War era, in which the testosterone, effectively neutralizing
Olympic medal count became politically the development in utero of male sex
signiﬁcant, suspicions of gender fraud characteristics typically triggered by the
by Communist countries—such as Y chromosome.24 Patino challenged
suspicions surrounding masculine- the IAAF’s decision and was reinstated
looking Soviet throwers Tashana and two years later.25 By then, Patino was
Irina Press—motivated the IOC to past her athletic prime, but due to her
impose sex veriﬁcation testing.17 The efforts, the IAAF’s sex-veriﬁcation
testing methods, which merely looked policy today includes AIS on its list
for evidence of the second inactive X of conditions that will not preclude
chromosome, would not have been athletes from competing in women’s
effective at detecting other kinds of sport.26 In the 1990s, the IOC updated
cheating, such as doping female athletes its sex veriﬁcation methods and
with high doses of testosterone. This adopted a Polymerase Chain Reaction
inconsistency casts doubt on the (PCR) process designed to test for
IOC’s stated objective, to police fraud, the presence of a Y chromosome
and suggests instead an objective of rather than the absence of a second
policing gender—that is, replicating X chromosome.27 Even PCR testing
hegemonic femininity by narrowly resulted in many false positives. Eight
deﬁning the category “woman.”18 of the over 3,000 female athletes at
Sex-veriﬁcation testing has also the Summer Games in Atlanta tested
affected women with chromosomal positive for the Y chromosome but were
anomalies that likely or demonstrably permitted to compete either because
produce no competitive advantage. further testing revealed AIS or another
The ﬁrst athlete to fail a sex-veriﬁcation condition that inhibits the masculinizing
test was a Polish sprinter named Ewa function
of
testosterone.28
19
Klobukowska.
In 1967, she was
In 1999, the IOC Executive
banned from sports and stripped of her Board responded to mounting
Olympic medals after genetic testing criticism, including criticism by the
revealed anomalous sex chromosomes American Medical Association and
in some cells (likely an XX/XY other professional associations,29 that
mosaicism20)—notwithstanding
the compulsory sex-veriﬁcation testing was
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expensive, unreliable, and an affront
to the dignity of female athletes, by
voting to abandon it. The IOC was
also responding to the argument that
existing drug testing procedures,
including monitored urine sample
requirements, were effective protection
against intentional fraud. However, in
abandoning the compulsory sex test,
the IOC endorsed a policy that, like
the IAAF’s policy, permits “suspicionbased testing” on a case-by-case
Organizers of Olympic
basis.30
Games in Beijing were responding
to that policy when they established
a laboratory to verify the sex of
suspicious-looking women at the 2008
Summer Games. Recognizing the
possibility that athletes could present
with “ambiguous gender orientation,”
the Chinese organizers planned
comprehensive evaluations of sexual
hormones, chromosomes and genes as
well as clinical observation, should the
need arise.31 While no such testing was
conducted, the laboratory’s existence
underscores the fact that IOC policy
would have permitted sex-veriﬁcation
testing to occur at the Olympic Games.
II. The Myth of Sex-Veriﬁcation
Testing
Even in the comprehensive
form anticipated by Beijing Olympic
organizers and used in the case of Caster
Semenya, sex veriﬁcation is problematic
for two main reasons. The ﬁrst reason
is that sex veriﬁcation supposes that
every athlete can be assigned to one
of two sex categories and ignores
the reality of gender multiplicity. As
suggested by the brief overview of
the history of sex-veriﬁcation testing
provided here, scientiﬁc inquiry into
sex is often inconclusive. Sex cannot
be distilled to a single, determinable
factor. Many biological and social
factors—including
chromosomes,
hormones, genitals, gender identity
and gender expression—contribute
to our interpretation of whether an
37

individual is male or female. In most governing bodies impose a binary
people, these factors appear consistent: structure onto a reality in which sex
sex chromosomes that are either exists on a continuum.34 The IOC’s
XX or XY will trigger hormones in recent policy allowing for participation
utero, and again in puberty, that cause by transsexual athletes, while a
genitalia and other sex-related physical progressive step toward including
features to develop in the “typical”
way. Most individuals identify with it is underinclusive because it ignores
and experience themselves to be the
factors other than sex that are more likely
sex that matches those chromosomes,
hormones, and physical features. to create an uneven ﬁeld for competition.
However, variations at the
chromosomal, hormonal, physical,
and psychological levels preclude athletes who would have otherwise been
conclusive assignment of “male” and excluded from women’s events due to
“female” labels in all cases. As Ewa their Y chromosomes, still operates
Kloubowska’s case demonstrates, on and underscores the false premise
sex chromosomes can defy the usual that sex is a binary.35 By requiring
XX or XY categories. Individuals transsexual athletes to have undergone
may present with XO, XXY, XYY, sex reassignment surgery, completed at
XXX or a mosaic condition in which least two years of hormone treatment,
different cells in the same individual’s and obtained legal recognition of the
body have different sex chromosomes. new sex, the policy only allows for
Conditions like AIS produce a body participation by those gender nonthat might be chromosomally male normative individuals most able and
but hormonally female, while other willing to conform to the gender
conditions like congenital adrenal binary by placing themselves through
hyperplasia cause individuals with surgical, medical, and legal means,
XX chromosomes to have masculine ﬁrmly on one side of the continuum or
genitalia. Other conditions affecting the other.36 It excludes any individual
physical
development
produce whose physical sex or gender identity
internal or external genitalia that places them in the gray area in between.
In sum, “sex veriﬁcation”
defy classiﬁcation as entirely male or
female; indeed, for one out of every testing is a myth. It operates on,
1500 to 2000 births, an expert in sex and harmfully reinforces, the false
differentiation must be called in to premise that medical testing can
interpret atypical presentation of determine sex as either male or female.
the baby’s gender.32 Transsexual and
transgender individuals, who have III. The Myth of the Level Playing
a gender identity that differs from
Field
their physical sex, also challenge
the assumption that sex and gender
The second reason that sex
indicators are always consistent. Based veriﬁcation is problematic is that
on variations such as these, Brown it places undue emphasis on sexUniversity scientist and author Anne segregation as a means for achieving
Fausto-Sterling dismiss Euro-American fairness.
The idea that fairness
culture’s rigid insistence on only two requires the strict separation of men’s
sexes, stating, “The body’s sex is simply and women’s sports is simultaneously
too complex. There is no either/or. overinclusive and underinclusive. It
Rather, there are shades of difference.”33 is overinclusive in that it applies even
By permitting sex-veriﬁcation in situations where strict separation
testing, the IOC and other athletic does not produce fairness. It is
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underinclusive because it ignores factors
other than sex that are more likely to
create an uneven ﬁeld for competition.
My ﬁrst point, that sex
segregation is applied more than fairness
requires, is another way of saying that
sex, or more precisely, male-ness, is
an imperfect proxy for competitive
advantage in sport.37 Sorting athletes
by sex does not necessarily sort them
by physical characteristics that are
considered relevant to sport. Owing
to the wide variation of physical
characteristics within sex categories
(a term I use loosely, in light of my
criticism above), some of the athletes
in the female group will be similar in
size, shape, and musculature to those
in the male group. An approach more
narrowly tailored to producing a level
playing ﬁeld would sort athletes by
physical characteristics, much the
same way sports like wrestling group
athletes by weight. Even this approach,
however, would not necessarily produce
a level playing ﬁeld, as correlations
between
physical
characteristics
and athletic performance, thought
widely assumed, are largely illusory.
Research about competitive
advantage and race illustrates this
point. When scientists demonstrated
that blacks generally have narrower
pelvic girdles than whites, many people
interpreted this as support for widely
held assumptions about the competitive
advantage of black sprinters. Yet there
is no evidence that narrower pelvic
girdles are, independent of race, a
predictor of speed. As one physiologist
told Sports Illustrated in 1997, “there’s
not a single characteristic that is unique
and always present and responsible
He
for [athletic] performance.”38
was discussing generalizations about
physical differences based on race, but
the same point—that physical traits do
not predict performance—applies to
sex differences as well. The absence of
a perfect correlation between sex and
athletic performance explains examples
of men competing against women and
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losing—such as when Hitler Youth
Hermann Ratjen ﬁnished fourth in
the women’s high jump, or when
tennis player Bobby Riggs famously
lost to Billy Jean King. The absence
of a perfect correlation between sex
and athletic performance also explains
why the existing gender gap in athletic
performance is demonstrably waning as
female athletes begin to overcome their
historical exclusion and marginalization
from sports. One Oxford University
study predicts that, at the rate women’s
running speed is improving, women
will be outrunning men at certain
track events sometime after 2064.39
Thus, separating men and
women is neither a perfect way, nor the
best way, to ensure that athletes only
compete against those with comparable
physical features and athletic ability. It
also fails to ensure fairness because
disparities other than sex-related
physical differences tilt the playing ﬁeld.
In the sporting world,
“fairness” is deﬁned as universal
adherence to the same rules. It is unfair
to give a runner a head start, break
the rules of play, or gain a physical
advantage through such unnatural
means as doping. While unnaturally
obtained physical advantages may run
afoul of fairness, fairness requires no
such categorical limitation on naturally
obtained physical advantages. Saying
that no one can use natural advantage
is antithetical to sport. The average
individual does not become a worldclass or Olympic athlete; indeed, it has
been said that “elite sport selects for
physiological outliers whose genetic
potential for excellence has been
realised through fortuitous interaction
with environmental and cultural
factors.”40 Yet variation due to nonsex-related conditions is not challenged
as beyond the bounds of fair play. For
example, the sport of volleyball does
not exclude athletes with Marfan’s
syndrome, even though individuals
with that condition have physical
characteristics, including tallness
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reconceptualizing sports to allow
for more integrated competitions
that group athletes by physical
characteristics other than sex. Weight
classes in wrestling, handicapping in
golf, grouping of common times in
road racing are examples of how similar
principles are already being applied.
In this new paradigm, sex veriﬁcation
would be unnecessary because an
athlete’s sex would be irrelevant to
determining the ﬁeld of competition
most appropriate for each competitor.
By abandoning the constraints of the
sex binary, this paradigm would reﬂect
a more intellectually honest approach
to sport and would be inclusive of
intersex and transgender athletes.
While such a paradigm shift may be a
valid long term goal, sex-segregation
of sports is not going away in the
short term. I simply argue here
the idea that segregation of athletes
that, as an intermediate step, the
by sex produces a level playing ﬁeld is IOC should prohibit sex-veriﬁcation
nothing short of myth
testing. The concept of testing for
sex deﬁes reality in which sex is a
construct—a reality in which our
Some athletes receive coaching at an interpretation of a person is based on
early age, some have ﬁnancial advantage a number of factors (genes, hormones,
due to class or afﬁliation with sponsors, anatomy, identity, expression) that may
and some have technologically superior or may not consistently conform to
equipment such as shark skin swimsuits the concept of male and female. If
or clap-skates.43 In some sports, players sport is to continue to rely on the myth
are advantaged or disadvantaged of discernable sex categories, it must
by changes in the weather44 or the acknowledge it as such, rather than
position of the sun. Even some insist that categorization is possible or
physical advantages obtained by that categorization is determinative of
unnatural means,45 such as laser eye a level playing ﬁeld. In short, the IOC
surgery or ligament replacement, are and other athletic governing bodies
permissible. These variables are likely must shed the overly rigid application
to enhance an athlete’s performance in of a sex binary in favor of a more
the same way that sex-related variables ﬂexible approach that allows athletes
can. Thus, the idea that segregation to participate in the category that is
of athletes by sex produces a level consistent with, or at least most closely
playing ﬁeld is nothing short of myth. approximates, their gender identity.
The IOC could implement a
IV. Proposal:
Prohibit
Sex ﬂexible approach by prohibiting sex
Veriﬁcation Testing
veriﬁcation testing and ensuring that
the only participants disqualiﬁed from
I am not proposing, at least women’s events are those intentionally
not here, that the IOC should abandon committing gender fraud. Under this
sex-segregated athletics. I do support approach, an intersex athlete like Caster
and long arms, that could provide a
competitive advantage in that sport.41
The IAAF may determine that Caster
Semenya has high testosterone levels
resulting from an intersex condition,
but it is possible—if not likely—that
her opponents have physical features
or testosterone levels that are outside
the typical range of most women.
If those opponents conform to the
arbitrary, heteronormative and white
standards of femininity, they are not
“suspicious,” and they are not tested.
To underscore even further the
shortcomings of sex-segregation as a
means of ensuring fairness, consider
that the so-called level playing ﬁeld
accommodates athletes not just with
natural physical advantages, but social
and environmental advantages as well.42
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Semenya would be eligible for women’s
track events because her female gender
identity is not in dispute. Under this
proposal, the only sex-related challenges
that the IOC or other governing bodies
would consider would be those rooted
in evidence tending to show that an
athlete’s self-selection into women’s
competition is not consistent with
the life she leads outside of sport.46
This intent-based standard should be
interpreted to exclude competitors like
Hermann Ratjen who are manipulated
or forced to cheat by a government.
An intent-based standard should not
be used to exclude transsexual athletes
who comply with the IOC’s policy on
transgender athlete participation; such
competitors should have an absolute
defense to charges that their gender
identity at the time of competition is
inconsistent with their gender expression
earlier in their lives or athletic careers.
Currently,
sex-veriﬁcation
policies treat an athlete’s eligibility based
on sex similarly to an athlete’s eligibility
based on involvement with banned
substances. In both contexts, eligibility
is determined by medical evidence, with
no consideration given to whether the
athlete intended to cheat.47 However,
the strict liability that applies in doping
cases is not warranted in cases where
sex is in dispute. One important
difference is that doping policies target
individual and categorical substances
“because of their potential to enhance
performance.”48
Sex-veriﬁcation
policies, however, are not so narrowly
tailored. The risk of unfairness that
strict liability poses in the context of
sex, compared to the risk in the context
of doping, is not as strongly outweighed
by a beneﬁt to the ﬁeld of competition.
Moreover, the risk of unfairness posed
by a strict liability approach is arguably
stronger when the ground for exclusion
is a naturally occurring chromosomal
or hormonal variation than when the
ground for exclusion is an exogenouslyobtained
competitive
advantage.
This proposal does not seek to
40

create a level playing ﬁeld. Rather, it
recognizes that sex-veriﬁcation and the
level playing ﬁeld are illusory goals,49
and in so doing avoids many of the
problems that result from the IOC’s
current policy of suspicion-based
sex-veriﬁcation testing. As Caster
Semenya’s case shows, the policy is rife
with abuse and selective application.
Moreover, considering the myth of the
level playing ﬁeld created by numerous
personal advantages that all athletes
bring to the starting line, sex-veriﬁcation
testing inﬂicts harm on the athlete’s
dignity, privacy and personal life that are
far disproportionate to any unfairness
that is being targeted by examining sex.
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A PRICE TAG ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: GEORGIA V. WEIS
AND INDIGENT RIGHT TO CONTINUED COUNSEL
By: Katy Bosse 1
“Thou shalt not ration justice.” –Judge
Learned Hand2
On February 2, 2006, Jamie
Weis was arrested and charged with the
robbery and murder of a local senior
citizen.3 Nearly seven months after
his initial arrest, the state notiﬁed the
Grifﬁn trial court of its intention to
seek the death penalty.4 In the Georgia
Public Defender system, created by the
Georgia Indigent Defense Act of 2003,
all death penalty cases are assigned
to the Georgia Capital Defender
Division instead of the local public
defender’s ofﬁce.5 In Weis’s case, the
overseeing Georgia Public Defender
Standards Council determined that
the Capital Defenders Division had a
tremendous caseload.6 And instead of
assigning another case to the already
overtaxed Capital Defenders Division,
the Council decided to assign private
attorneys Robert Citronberg and
Thomas West on a contractual basis.7
From January 24, 2007
through November 26, 2007, the
defense attorneys ﬁled over sixty
motions on Weis’s behalf.8 During that
time, the Georgia Capital Defenders
also handled the high proﬁle case of
Brian Nichols,9 which exhausted most
of its 2007 annual budget and depleted
the funds available for other cases.10
Citronberg and West ﬁled for four
continuances between January 24 and
November 26, 2007,11 because the state
could no longer afford to pay them for
their time.12 On November 26, 2007,
District Attorney Scott Ballard made
an oral motion to remove Citronberg
and West from the case, and suggested
that attorneys from the local public
defender’s ofﬁce be placed on the case
instead.13 Judge Caldwell sustained the
state’s motion and removed Citronberg
and West.14 Subsequently, two public
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defenders, Tamara Jacobs and Joseph
Saia, were assigned as counsel.15
This article explores the
origins of an indigent defendant’s right
to counsel and demonstrates how the
facts of the Weis case illustrate the
need for a deﬁnitive right to continued
counsel. Part I traces the procedural
history of Weis, the history of the
right to counsel in America, and the
current jurisdictional split on the right
to continued counsel. Part II analyzes
the current Supreme Court language
on indigent right to continued counsel,
and suggests how Weis provides an
opportunity for the Court to resolve the
issue in favor of indigent defendants.
Analyzing the procedural history and
arguments described below, it is evident
that denying Weis the right to retain
his court appointed counsel violates
his Sixth Amendment right to a fair
trial, because he was without effective
counsel for over a year during which the
prosecution continued to mount its case.
I. How We Got to a Continued
Counsel Split
a. The Georgia Decision
“I guess the Supreme Court will
have to earn their money.” –Judge
Caldwell16
On December 10, 2007, the
two public defenders assigned to Weis’s
case, Jacobs and Saia, ﬁled a motion
to withdraw as counsel due to “their
inability to duplicate the familiarity
with the case.”17 The motion was
denied.18 Subsequently, Weis ﬁled
another motion on December 20,
which contained an afﬁdavit from
Joseph Saia that detailed the current
workload of his ofﬁce and his ninetyone open felony cases.19 Additionally,

Weis and his public defenders ﬁled
several other motions to withdraw,
along with a motion requesting Judge
Caldwell recuse himself from the
case, and a petition for mandamus and
prohibition against Judge Caldwell.20
On April 25, 2008, the
Georgia Capital Defenders indicated in
discussions that funding would again
be available to Citronberg and West.
However, when provided a contract,
the Georgia Capital Defenders refused
to process the bills.21 On December
31, 2008, Weis ﬁled a petition for a writ
of mandamus against the judge and the
Public Defender Standards Council,
which was dropped after the judge agreed
to reinstate Citronberg and West.22
Citronberg and West were reassigned as counsel on February 11,
2009.23 However, as a New York Times
article describes, “[the][p]rosecutors
had steadily built a case while the
defense did nothing. Leads went
cold, memories faded, witnesses went
missing.”24
Nevertheless, the trial
was set for August 3rd, 2009, with
evidentiary motions scheduled for July
8, 2009.25 On July 8, Weis ﬁled a motion
to dismiss due to the denial of his right
to a speedy trial.26 The motion was
denied and counsel appealed.27 The
decision was afﬁrmed by the Georgia
Supreme Court on March 25, 2010.28
The Georgia Supreme Court
analyzed the case under the Barker
v. Wingo four-part balancing test for
assessing a speedy trial claim.29 Under
the test, a court must balance (1) the
length of the delay and (2) the reasons
for the delay with (3) the defendant’s
assertion of a right to a speedy trial and
(4) the prejudice to the defendant.30 The
court found that the length of the delay
did not violate the defendant’s right to
a speedy trial, and that the reasons for
the delay did not constitute a “systemic
43

breakdown of the public defender
system.”31 The court concluded that
the delay was due to Weis’s failure
to cooperate with Jacobs and Saia,
the public defenders appointed after
Citronberg and West were removed.32
Speciﬁcally, the court ruled
that a defendant could not assert the
right of counsel of choice to delay
judicial proceedings.33
The court
acknowledged that the lack of funding
contributed to the delay but decided
that it was not the sole factor.34 The
court ruled that a lack of funding from
the Georgia Capital Defenders was
not a “systemic breakdown” of the
public defender system, and thus was
not the primary reason for the delay.35
Instead, the court found that the
defendant’s conduct and the conduct
of Citronberg and West, i.e., not being
able to work without compensation,
was the primary reason for the delay.36
Rather than acknowledge that the
state’s public defender system had
failed the very people it was designed
to protect, the court chose to blame the
two appointed public defenders, Jacobs
and Saia, and Weis for not being able
to easily replicate an attorney-client
relationship.37 The court also ruled
that Weis did not assert his right to a
speedy trial in a timely manner,38 and
there was no evidence of oppressive
pre-trial incarceration or proof that
Weis had been subjected to substandard
conditions in the county jail.39
Conversely,
the
dissent
examined the right of an indigent
defendant to continued counsel,
citing the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals decision Lane v. Alabama,
which quotes Smith v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles County:
[O]nce counsel is
appointed to represent
an indigent defendant,
whether it [is] the public
defender or a volunteer
private attorney, the
parties enter into
44

an
attorney-client
relationship
which
is no less inviolable
than if counsel had
been retained.
To
hold
otherwise
would be to subject
that
relationship
to an unwarranted
and
invidious
discrimination
arising merely from
the poverty of the
accused.40
The dissent concluded that
a defendant should not be forced to
choose between his original counsel
and new counsel in order to receive
a speedy trial at the hands of the
state.41 The dissent also correctly
assailed the majority’s argument by
emphasizing that Weis could hardly
be held responsible for the delay when
the public defenders assigned to the
case requested to be removed almost
immediately.42 The majority also erred,
the dissent indicated, in ﬁnding that
Weis and his attorneys were at fault,
when it was the state’s organization
that initially hired and then could not
compensate Citronberg and West.43
The dissent reasoned that even though
the state agency is focused on the
defense rather than the prosecution of
criminals, the state is still obligated to
provide adequate funding, concluding
that the state’s budgetary constraints
were not a valid excuse for depriving
a citizen his appointed counsel.44
After the unfavorable Georgia
Supreme Court decision, Citronberg
and West ﬁled a petition for writ of
certiorari before the Supreme Court of
the United States.45 The writ called for
the Court to resolve the division among
state courts regarding indigent defense
and the continuity of representation.46
On October 4th, 2010, the Court denied
the petition for writ without comment.47

b. The History of the Right to
Counsel
“[T]here [is] an absolute right to
appointment of counsel in felony
cases. . . . [A]ppointment of counsel
for an indigent is required at every
stage of a criminal proceeding where
substantial rights of a criminal
accused might be affected.”48
The Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution guarantees
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial . . . and to
have the [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for
his defen[s]e.”49 The Supreme Court
ﬁrst recognized the fundamental
nature of the right to counsel in 1932
in Powell v. Alabama, noting that the
assistance of counsel was essential to
a fair trial.50 Later, in the landmark
decision, Gideon v. Wainwright, the
Supreme Court recognized this
right for indigent defendants, stating
“[t]he right of one charged with [a]
crime to counsel may not be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trials
in some countries, but it is in ours.”51
The Gideon Court held that when a
defendant is unable to obtain counsel,
the state must assign counsel because
“[t]his noble ideal cannot be realized if
the poor man charged with crime has
to face his accusers without a lawyer to
assist him.”52 However, the decision
in Gideon, while obligating the states to
appoint counsel, maintained a narrow
focus that did not identify to what
extent the right to counsel extended.53
While states instituted Gideon’s
mandate with varying success, the
Supreme Court continued to attempt
to deﬁne the right to counsel and its
effect on the practice of criminal law.
In 1970, the Court indirectly analogized
that the right to counsel was the right to
competent counsel. In 1983, in Morris
v. Slappy, the assigned public defender
fell ill and the client was assigned
a new public defender rather than
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being granted a continuance.54 The
Supreme Court in Morris held that the
Sixth Amendment does not guarantee
a meaningful relationship between a
defendant and counsel.55 However, in
Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion,
he argued that judicial efﬁciency should
not stand in the way of an indigent
defendant’s continued representation
by an attorney with whom he has a
relationship of trust and conﬁdence.56
This point aside, viewing the
Court’s decisions from 1970-1983
retrospectively, had the court drafted
clearer language regarding the right
to counsel, the Court could have
reshaped attitudes and created a much
more organized and superior indigent
defense system.57 Had the Court been
more willing to provide guidelines
for what constitutes meaningful
representation, the Court would
have likely drafted a set of minimum
requirements that all public defenders
must meet when conducting a criminal
defense. Furthermore, State legislatures
could have taken such standards into
account when drafting legislation
and appropriating funds to the state
criminal defense agencies. However,
without such standards, many states
are unable to effectively allocate the
appropriate level of funds needed by
these agencies, and as a result, those
needing representation, the state
agencies, and the already dwindling
budgets suffered.58
The vague
standard of “effective” allowed state
legislatures to both design and fund
the bare minimum of criminal defense.
Finally, in 1984 in Strickland
v. Washington, the Court attempted to
address the guidelines of what should
constitute “effective counsel.”59 In
an opinion by Justice O’Connor, the
Court adopted the standard adopted by
all the Federal Courts of Appeals and
held that assistance of counsel should
be “reasonably effective.”60 The Court
adopted a two-prong analysis that
considers “(1) whether the lawyer’s
performance fell below acceptable
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levels and (2) whether that performance
prejudiced the accused.”61 Although
the Court refused to set rigid standards
for what qualiﬁes as reasonable,
Justice O’Connor enumerated basic
duties of counsel: to be loyal, to avoid
conﬂicts of interest, to advocate the
defendant’s cause, and to consult with
the defendant on important decisions.62
Justice O’Connor also suggested that
American Bar Association (ABA)
guidelines should help to determine
what is reasonable, and that strict
rules on reasonableness should be
avoided so as to give counsel ﬂexibility
in making strategic decisions.63
Justice Marshall, in his dissent
in Strickland, laments the majority’s
refusal to set stricter standards for the
deﬁnition of “reasonably effective.”64
He describes the many aspects of
the criminal defense system, such
as preparing for trial, applying for
bail, making timely objections, and
ﬁling for appeals, that would all
beneﬁt from judicial oversight.65 As
Justice Marshall’s dissent points out,
the majority’s vague language in
Strickland left the states on their own
to determine how to enforce Gideon’s
right to counsel mandate.66 Justice
Marshall reasoned that if stricter and
more speciﬁc standards for the various
aspects of trial had been concretely set,
states would have had a clearer idea of
how to build and fund their criminal
defense systems.67 More importantly,
the criminal justice system around
the country could operate on a more
uniform level, providing equal access
and fair processing for all defendants.68
c.

Varied State Responses

In the years since Strickland
and Gideon, states have individually
fashioned their own standards in
deﬁning what constitutes “reasonably
effective” counsel.
Unfortunately,
these standards can vary greatly from
state to state.69 In 2004, forty years
after Gideon, the ABA published

a scathing report on the nation’s
indigent defense systems.70
The
report noted the extreme disparities
in funding between the prosecution
and the defense, the excessive caseload
of public defense attorneys, and
the inadequate assistance provided
to indigent defendants as a result.71
No standard provides more
evidence of the disparities in state
systems than the right to continued
counsel, also known as vertical
representation.72 While Georgia and
Louisiana still do not recognize an
indigent defendant’s right to continued
counsel, state courts have ruled that
indigent defendants have a right to
continued counsel as part of their Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. This
point is evidenced by the fact that even
the states surrounding Georgia have
chosen to support and uphold the right
to counsel for indigent defendants.73
For example, in Lane v.
Alabama, a defendant’s initial attorney
was removed because of the state’s
intention to call him as a necessary
witness.74 In assessing whether such
an act violated the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial, the
court claimed that “[w]ith respect to
continued representation . . . there is no
distinction between indigent defendants
and
non-indigent
defendants.”75
Essentially, once counsel has been
appointed, the trial judge is required to
respect the attorney-client relationship
as if it were privately retained counsel.76
Similarly, in Weaver v. Florida, the Florida
Supreme Court held that the attorneyclient relationship is not dependant on
the source of compensation because
the attorney should be loyal to the
person he or she represents, not to
the person who pays for the services.77
States that recognize the right
to continued counsel for indigent
defendants have created exceptions
to this right. The Weaver court laid
out several reasons why it may be
appropriate to substitute counsel, such as
incompetence, physical incapacitation,
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inappropriate conduct, or the efﬁcient
administration of justice.78 In Tennessee
v. Huskey, a case in which the trial judge
attempted to dismiss counsel for ﬁling
an abundance of motions, the court
analogized that an attorney-client
relationship involves “an intimate
process of consultation and planning
which culminates in a state of trust
and conﬁdence between the client and
his attorney.”79 The Tennessee court
concluded that based on case law from
other states, the removal of original
counsel is only permitted when all
other remedies have been exhausted.80
While many states have
interpreted the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Gideon and Strickland to
include an indigent right to continued
counsel, Georgia and Louisiana have
expressly denied the right of an indigent
defendant to retain counsel.81 In Weis,
the Georgia Supreme court relied on the
Louisiana decision, Louisiana v. Reeves,
to support its holding that moving the
case forward was a sufﬁcient reason to
justify the substitution of counsel.82
The facts of Reeves are extremely similar
to Weis, in that in Reeves the court
removed non-local counsel who was
paid by the Capital Defense Project,
and replaced him with the local Chief
Public Defender.83 The court justiﬁed
the removal by claiming that the right
to counsel of choice does not extend
to defendants who require court
appointed counsel.84 In Louisiana,
an indigent defendant is entitled
only to “effective representation.”85
The Sixth Circuit of the
United States Court of Appeals
upheld this interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment in Daniels v. Laﬂer.86 The
Daniels court held that an indigent
defendant represented by a court
appointed attorney has no right to
his or her choice of counsel.87 While
serving on the Second Circuit of
the United States Court of Appeals,
current Supreme Court Justice
Sonia Sotomayor also ruled that
“there is no constitutional right to
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continuity of appointed counsel.”88
II. Indigent Continued Counsel
Needs More Support
a. A Meaningful Relationship
The Supreme Court needs to
clarify its dicta in Morris and hold that
the non-existence of a right to chosen
counsel is not the denial of a right to
continued counsel once an attorneyclient relationship has been established.
Determining that the Sixty Amendment
guarantees a right to continued counsel
does not overturn Morris, nor does it
affect the Court’s decision that an
indigent defendant does not have the
right to choose his initial counsel.
Instead, it extends the rights of indigent
defendants and grants them rights
equal to defendants with paid counsel.
The language used in Morris
makes it clear that the Court was
referring only to the creation of
a new Sixth Amendment right to
“meaningful representation.”
The
frequently quoted language reads:
No
court
could
possibly
guarantee
that a defendant will
develop the kind
of rapport with his
attorney – privately
retained or provided
by the public – that
the Court of Appeals
thought part of the
Sixth
Amendment
guarantee of counsel.
Accordingly, we reject
the claim that the
Sixth
Amendment
guarantees
a
“meaningful
relationship” between
an accused and his
counsel.89
Rejecting the idea that the Sixth
Amendment contains a guarantee of a

“meaningful relationship” between the
defendant and counsel is not the same
as rejecting an indigent defendant’s
right to retain his original counsel
once an attorney-client relationship
has been forged. While the court has
been explicit that it will not create
a constitutional guarantee that the
relationship will be meaningful, they
have not denied a defendant’s right
to continuity of appointed counsel.
b. Strickland’s Vagueness Problem
The reasonableness standard
set forth in Strickland is intentionally
vague. While the court does not set
speciﬁc standards, Justice O’Connor’s
opinion makes it clear that standard legal
practice and ABA guidelines should guide
both lawyers and judges to determine
what constitutes a reasonably effective
level of counsel.90 Unfortunately, as
Kim Taylor-Thompson, a veteran
Washington, D.C. public defender,
explains, “[t]he unappreciated cost of
the Court’s lack of speciﬁcity has been
a legacy of ineffective assistance that
has now shifted the onus of deﬁning
the components of the right to counsel
to the indigent defense community.”91
As a result of the vague standard in
Strickland, an indigent defendant is
currently only entitled to relief if the
court appoints a new attorney and
does not allow for sufﬁcient time to
prepare, thus forcing the counsel’s
representation to be ineffective.92
The current ABA Ten Principles
of a Public Defender System guide maintains
that “the same attorney continuously
represents the client until completion
of the case.”93 Additionally, the guide
further asserts that the same attorney
should represent the client from the
initial assignment through the trial and
sentencing.94 In Gideon’s Broken Promise,
the ABA’s 2004 study of the nation’s
indigent criminal defense standards,
the ABA reported that national
standards have long recognized a right
to continued counsel as an essential
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component of an effective defense
practice.95
The same study also
found that many states still practiced
“horizontal representation,” where
multiple public defenders handled
different aspects of a single case.96
In contrast, the study reported that,
in some states, the same prosecutor
handled the prosecution of a defendant
from beginning to end, largely due
to the ample funding available to
the state’s prosecuting agency.97
c. Strickland’s Guidelines
The language used in Strickland
demonstrates that even though the court
has been vague in its rulings on what
constitutes “effective representation,”
the duties they believe apply to all
defense attorneys are more effectively
performed when there is a right to
continued counsel. The Court stated
that “the Sixth Amendment imposes
on counsel a duty to investigate,”98
and that “access to counsel’s skill and
knowledge is necessary to accord
defendants the ‘ample opportunity
to meet the case of the prosecution’
to which they are entitled.”99 Based
on the author’s experience observing
and clerking in several public defender
ofﬁces and local criminal court
systems, when multiple attorneys
handle a single case, investigation is
often neglected or left until witnesses’
memories have faded and the “trail”
has gone cold. Similarly, the author
has also found that each attorney
might have different knowledge and
defense strategies that will affect the
outcome of a case. Switching between
attorneys causes confusion not only
for the defendant, but also for the
prosecuting attorney who must adjust
to different defense strategies, and
the judges who must rule on differing
motions ﬁled by different attorneys
or rule on the same motion several
times due to the change in counsel.
The Strickland Court also
imposed a “duty of loyalty” and “the
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more particular duties to consult with
the defendant on important decisions
and to keep the defendant informed of
important developments in the course
of the prosecution.”100 Continuing to
keep the client informed of important
developments, seeking the client’s
opinion on important decisions,
and guiding the client through those
decisions are extremely difﬁcult when
the same attorney does not represent
the client throughout the entire case.
d. The Beneﬁts of Continued Counsel
The language in Strickland,
though vague, makes it clear that
the Supreme Court upholds certain
standards for effective criminal defense,
all of which are easier to adhere to
when there is continued counsel. A
lack of continued counsel generates
the following problems: (1) it prevents
the establishment of an attorney-client
relationship, (2) it encourages a lack
of accountability, and (3) it increases
the likelihood that necessary and
important work will be neglected as
the case moves between attorneys.101
i.

The Attorney-Client
Relationship

The relationship between
an attorney and a client is a vital
component of conducting an effective
defense. Ideally, a defense attorney
creates a collaborative relationship with
a client, instead of merely dictating
to the client his decisions and legal
strategy. A collaborative relationship
requires open communication, which
necessitates a substantial amount of
interaction between the attorney and
client. Through this communication,
the attorney and the client will
collaboratively answer many of the
essential questions that are presented
during a criminal trial, such as how
to plead, whether to proceed to trial,
and whether or not the client should
testify. To answer these questions

and facilitate open communication,
many public defender ofﬁces view
continued counsel as a fundamental
requirement.102 By being involved in a
case from beginning to end, an attorney
can track the case’s investigation,
and become better informed about
the facts and key issues, allowing
for more effective representation.
ii. Lack of Accountability
Similarly, when a client moves
between multiple attorneys during the
progression of a case, ﬁles get lost,
motions are not ﬁled, and discovery
does not get examined. Because a new
attorney may have been assigned to a
speciﬁc portion of the case, or perhaps
has taken over the case completely, a
predicament is created in which the
client does not know who to go to for
information, or even what information
is needed.
This disorganization
fosters a lack of accountability and
usually results in inadequate defense.
A client, particularly an indigent
client, is generally unaware and does
not understand the legal process and
procedural requirements for motions
for continuances, or the steps to
assure that previous motions were
ﬁled correctly. When more than one
attorney represents a client at different
junctures throughout the case, the
client does not know whom to hold
accountable, and thus, is without
recourse. A right to continued counsel
ensures that the client knows exactly
who to contact and would also hold the
speciﬁc attorney accountable for all ﬁles
and motions associated with the case.
iii. Neglected Work
Attorneys also differ in
their trial strategy, oratory skills, and
the weight they give to certain legal
issues.103 The same case in the hands
of two different attorneys can look
extremely different; thus, a client may
suffer from an involuntary change in
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counsel. Following an involuntary
change in counsel, the new attorney
may develop a divergent strategy or
need to re-conduct investigation.
But most important, a new attorney
must gain the defendant’s trust. The
chances of discovery being overlooked
or a motion not being ﬁled in a
timely manner increase exponentially
when a case shifts between attorneys.
A right to continued counsel
permits continued communication
between the client and counsel that
builds client conﬁdence and enables
the relationship to evolve over
time.104 Evidenced by the irrefutable
beneﬁts of continued counsel detailed
above, to deny a defendant continued
counsel undermines their Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance
of counsel.
As Anne Poulin, a
Villanova law professor and proliﬁc
writer on Criminal Procedure, argues
in Strengthening the Criminal Defendant’s
Right to Counsel, “[a] defendant
should not be forced to reestablish
an
attorney-client
relationship
with each of a series of attorneys,
repeatedly explaining the case and her
understanding of it to new counsel.”105
e.

Jamie Weis’s Lasting Legacy

“Whenever possible, substitution of
counsel over the defendant’s objection
should be avoided. Changing
counsel without the defendant’s
consent reduces the likelihood that
the defendant will receive effective
assistance, and will perceive the
process as fair.”106
In Weis, Citronberg and West,
Weis’s original counsel, though court
appointed, worked tirelessly for over
a year to investigate and prepare
Weis’s capital murder defense. They
developed an open communication
with Weis and learned about his mental
health problems, family history, and his
life both before and after the alleged
murder. Weis submitted an afﬁdavit
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stating that he could “trust Mr. West
and Mr. Citronberg with my case and
. . . my life. They truly care about me
and I believe they have the knowledge
and skill to prepare a defense.”107
The public defenders assigned to
replace Citronberg and West did
not have access to investigators
trained in uncovering the mitigating
circumstances surrounding Weis’s case,
which can be pivotal in a capital murder
defense. When Citronberg and West
were removed from the case, more than
a year lapsed in which there was no
investigation. Based on the Supreme
Court’s language in Strickland, it is
evident that once West and Citronberg
were removed from the case, there was
no longer “effective” representation.
The procedural history of this
case raises a myriad of issues. Ranging
from the state’s burden to fund its
criminal defense and prosecution
agencies equally, to the attempts on
the part of Citronberg and West to use
Weis’s case as a test case for structural
litigation to improve Georgia’s indigent
defense system. The most obvious,
however, is whether Weis has the same
right to keep his original counsel, as
he would if he had privately retained
counsel with his own funds. When
Judge Caldwell removed Citronberg
and West, despite Weis’s objections, and
replaced them with public defenders
who were unable to continue the
work necessary to provide Weis with
effective counsel, they effectively
denied Weis’s Sixth Amendment rights.
The Supreme Court of
Georgia and the Supreme Court of
Louisiana both cite Morris in their
rulings. Both courts held that there is
no right to “meaningful representation”
between an attorney and a client,
and also that there is no right for an
indigent defendant to choose his
initial attorney. Accordingly, both
concluded that an indigent defendant
has no right to continuity of appointed
counsel, regardless of the established
attorney-client relationship. Both the

prosecution and the Georgia Supreme
Court have misinterpreted these rulings
when they connote that there is no
right to continued counsel to be found
in the Sixth Amendment.108 While the
obvious solution to the prosecution
in Weis was to replace Citronberg and
West, who refused to continue without
pay, with already salaried public
defenders, the Constitutional rights
of an indigent defendant are no less
substantial because he or she is indigent.
The beneﬁts of an attorney-client
relationship and the continuity of that
relationship have been discussed above.
These beneﬁts are constitutionally
guaranteed to those who retain private
counsel, and should not be diminished
for those who cannot. Although they
declined to do so in the Weis case, the
Supreme Court needs to ﬁnd that its
language in Strickland and in Morris
does not preclude it from holding
that an indigent defendant has a right
to retain counsel as if he or she had
privately retained the counsel. To ﬁnd
otherwise is to put a price tag on our
constitutional rights and continue to
ignore the injustice that Gideon sought
to correct over forty-ﬁve years ago.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court has
continually refused to set speciﬁc
guidelines for effective counsel,
assuming that states and local bar
associations would conform to certain
agreed-upon standards. However,
twenty-ﬁve years after Strickland, it is
clear that this is not always the case.
The Court needs to recognize many of
the base standards of effective defense
counsel, beginning with the right
to continued counsel. The Georgia
Supreme Court erred in ﬁnding that
Weis and his attorneys were to blame
for the delay in his case, and thus, erred
in concluding that it was acceptable
to remove Weis’ original appointed
counsel despite Weis’ objections. The
dissent in Weis was correct; a state
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cannot adequately fund its prosecution
and underfund its defense.109 However,
the real harm done by the state’s lack
of funding was to deprive Weis of his
appointed counsel. Depriving Weis
of his appointed counsel gave the
prosecution an automatic advantage,

and thus, denied Weis of his
Constitutional right to a fair trial. The
Supreme Court erred in not granting
certiorari to Weis’s case and taking the
opportunity to rule that a state cannot
deny an indigent defendant his right
to continued counsel. The State of

Georgia has already begun applying its
decision in Weis to other cases and will
continue to deprive Georgia’s indigent
defendants of their constitutional rights
until the Supreme Court takes action.110
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BUYING INTO PRISONS, AND SELLING KIDS SHORT
By: Lizbet Simmons1

There is an increasing need to account for the role
of the nation’s failing public school system in structuring
incarceration risk among minority populations and to
link theories of the minority achievement gap with those
of disproportionate minority conﬁnement. The minority
achievement gap is so named, because, on average, minority
students’ school performance is much lower than that
of White students.2 The disparity is greatest between
African-American and White students and persists in a
range of assessments, including standardized test scores,
dropout rates, and graduation rates.3 Disproportionate
minority conﬁnement refers to racial disparities in
incarceration rates, and again, the disparity is greatest
when comparing African-Americans and Whites.4
The incarceration rate for minorities is highly
disproportionate to their total percentage in the population.5
African-Americans represent about 12% of the national
population but make up 40 % of the U.S. prison population.6
If the current trend of incarceration holds, one in three
African-American male children born in 2001 will go to
prison at some point during their lives.7 For Latino males,
the ratio is one in seven, and for Caucasian males, the ratio
is one in seventeen. These data shows that extant race
and gender dynamics put African-American male children
at signiﬁcant risk for incarceration. Educational failure
within this population only increases this vulnerability.
The prison system began a massive expansion
during the War on Crime era. In 1980, 300,000 people
were in prison in the United States.8 By 2005, there were
1.5 million individuals in prison. Today, it is estimated
that the prison and jail system holds 2.3 million.9 One
explanation for a steep rise in incarceration rates should be a
corresponding steep rise in crime. However, crime rates in
the 20-year span between 1980 and 2000 either dropped or
stagnated;10 the rapid rise in incarceration does not actually
correspond to a rise in crime. A signiﬁcant factor in prison
expansion was a 975% increase in commitments for nonviolent offenses, such as drug charges, between 1982 and
1999.11 During that time, African-Americans were at an
extreme disadvantage in drug charge processing and were
ultimately incarcerated at signiﬁcantly higher rates than
Whites even for virtually identical crimes.12 The terrain of
these data, which is well charted with respect to race and
incarceration, undergirds my inquiry into how the war on
crime has directly affected minority populations in childhood.
The ideologies and policies of the War on Crime
are made manifest in disciplinary arrangements in urban
public schools. As French philosopher Michel Foucault
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suggests, schools have always been disciplinary institutions.13
Schools organize students, control them, grade them, rank
them, track them; this is the making of Foucault’s docile
body.14 Presently, though, we are experiencing a unique
cultural moment in which the gold standard of school
discipline is punitive. In this era, youth are exposed to the
criminal justice system by way of their public education and
prior to criminal activity.15 The consequences include the
expansion of the minority achievement gap and increased
risk of incarceration that leads to disproportionate
minority conﬁnement. What is at stake here is the loss
of educational opportunity, the acculturation of youth to
criminalization, and a negative redirection of students’ life
paths. These risks are borne not only by individual students,
but also by their communities and the larger democracy.16
The criminal justice system has signiﬁcantly
inﬂuenced schools nationally in terms of policy, cultural
practice, stafﬁng and technology.17 School disciplinary
policies are increasingly designed to mirror criminal justice
enforcements, and zero-tolerance measures originating
in the war on crime are now common in the education
system.18 In fact, zero-tolerance became a requirement
for school funding by way of the Gun-Free Schools Act
of 1994.19 Though the term “zero-tolerance” is not used
in the Gun-Free Schools Act, the law dictated an automatic
punishment of school expulsion of at least one year for
gun possession on school grounds.20 In time, this kind
of strict disciplinary enforcement came to be known
as zero-tolerance and began to play a signiﬁcant role in
regulating a wide range of student behaviors, including
tardiness, disrespectful language, the expression of violent
threats, and inadvertent transgressions of school rules.21
Zero-tolerance policies sponsor exclusionary school
disciplinary practices, such as suspension and expulsion.
Because these policies do not allow for discretion, even
minor offenses can be deemed intolerable. Fairly recently,
an adolescent boy with a hyperactive diagnosis was punished
under a zero-tolerance policy for saying during a cafeteria
conversation, “I am going to get you,” to classmates whom
he suspected of eating potatoes intended for him.22 The
child was suspended from school, placed in the custody
of the local police, charged with “terrorist threats,”
and incarcerated for two weeks while awaiting his trial.
The penchant for youth criminalization has
sponsored increased police presence at schools, including
uniformed and armed guards. The ﬁeld of school
policing is expanding faster than every other division of
law enforcement.23 Carceral technologies have also been
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employed at schools, and surveillance cameras are now 24 % more campus security guards, and navigate ﬁve
common features of school security.24 A large majority times more metal detectors.36 African-American students
of newly built schools are fully equipped with surveillance comprise about 17% of all students but are over 33% of
systems.25 With the addition of metal detectors, biometric those suspended from school for disciplinary reasons.37
devices, and similar technologies, the school security market This punishment falls disproportionately on Africanhas grown into a multi-billion dollar industry – big business American males and has signiﬁcant consequences for
in the neo-liberal state.26 This privatization of the public incarceration risk.38 The experience of school suspension
sphere supports capital expansion and sponsors social control more than doubles the likelihood of adult incarceration.39
ideologies. Further, it reinforces a shift in governance away In other words, punitive school disciplinary policies
from the social welfare state and toward the penal state.27 further the expansion of the prison system itself, largely
The new punitive culture of public schools is deeply at the expense of the African-American community.
troubling, because it negatively affects the lives of children.
New Orleans, where I have conducted research
While children are vulnerable, it is a gross error to reduce since 2002, provides the quintessential example of school
their vulnerability to the “problem” of crime – especially and prison coordination. The disciplinary culture of New
when doing so masks more signiﬁcant challenges.28 We Orleans Public Schools is inﬂuenced by the war on crime’s
should also be clear that children are victims of crime less priority for law and order in governance. I began my research
frequently in school than out of school. Less than 1% of in New Orleans when a small group of local students
child homicides happen in school, and non-fatal school were suspended or expelled from their schools – most for
crime has been reduced over 60% between 1992 and minor and non-violent offenses such as insubordination or
2004.29 While it would be convenient to interpret this crime tardiness. The students were reassigned to a new school that
decline as proof that school security
opened at the Orleans Parish Prison,
30 punitive school disciplinary policies further
is effective, it would be inaccurate.
and this institution became the center
Crime began dropping in school prior the expansion of the prison system itself, of my interpretive case study and the
to the institutionalization of zero largely at the expense of the African- focus of my ﬁeld note observations
tolerance policies and prior to advances
and locally conducted interviews,
American community.
in school surveillance and fortiﬁcation.
which
spanned
approximately
Crime against youth continued to drop
two years.
I contextualized the
in schools just as it dropped in society at large, suggesting qualitative data I gathered with statistical information
that school security features were not the catalyst.31 on school performance and school punishment from
Is it possible that crime in schools could have local school and district archives, and I supplemented
dropped further had it not been for the ramping up of the data set with a vast collection of local documents
school security? Pedro Noguera, an expert in urban including school board minutes and newspaper clippings.
education, has argued that punitive school disciplinary
The school was in a building on the grounds of
policies dehumanize students and, thereby, produce a harsh the prison complex, and the students were there for twelve
school climate that sponsors violence.32 Recently, other hours a day. At the school, the law and order paradigm
scholars have joined Noguera in focusing on the negative was palpable. There were surveillance cameras at every
effect of criminalizing school cultures. The sociologist Paul corner, bars on the windows, and armed deputies to keep
Hirschﬁeld claims that the harsh school disciplinary policies the students in line. Educational advancement was dethat result in student suspension and expulsion label youth as prioritized. There were no credentialed teachers, no
“future prisoners in need of coercive control or exclusion” textbooks, and no courses leading to high school graduation.
and generate “a self-fulﬁlling prophesy.”33 This claim is This program was actually a school reform initiative designed
supported by the work of educational scholars, Richard by the Criminal Sheriff and supported by the superintendent
Arum and Irenee Beattie, who have statistically proven of schools, who was a former colonel in the Marines.
that punitive treatments in school, such as suspension,
In 2002, the year the prison school opened, there
increase the risk of adult incarceration.34 In short, these were many signs of socioeconomic distress in New Orleans
data suggests that we are expanding childhood vulnerability that preceded Hurricane Katrina and then exacerbated the
with the very measures we have employed to provide safety. storm’s effects. The severely underperforming Orleans
The research on school discipline indicates that Parish Public Schools were serving a student population
punitive policies, practices, and ideologies are magnifying that was 93% African-American and 80% low-income, and
the vulnerability of our most marginalized student groups.35 the schools ranked at the bottom of the nation.40 In 2000,
Compared to Whites in their peer group, African-American only 25% of third graders and 29% of ninth graders in New
students experience nearly 6% more school surveillance, Orleans met national averages on the standardized Iowa Test
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of Basic Skills.41 Two of the young boys I came to know in
my research reﬂected these larger patterns. They were lowincome, African-American boys, each with a long history of
academic failure. Both attended a middle school where 40
% of the eighth grade class in one year did not advance to
the ninth grade. When I asked the students what traditional
school was like for them, one explained that he always felt
behind in his lessons and could not seem to catch up in his
classes, where the student-teacher ratio was as high as thirtythree to one.42 His mother said he often came home in tears.
The academic failure of New Orleans Public Schools
is further revealed by school disciplinary measures. On the
district level in 2000-2001, almost 16% of all district students
were suspended during the school year.43 When these data is
analyzed by race and gender, however, the numbers become
even more striking. In the 2002-2003 school year, for
example, over 25% of African-American males in the New
Orleans Public School System were suspended at least once
and lost instruction time as a result.44 One of the students
in my research was suspended and sent to the prison school
because he had skipped classes; another because he had
often been late to homeroom. Neither saw their disciplinary
offenses as warranting a prison-style punishment.
The space and experience of the school in the
prison were completely bafﬂing to the New Orleans public
school students who found themselves constantly restricted,
regimented and surveilled. One student explained that the
security arrangements at the school forced him to confront a
negative image of himself, which he rejected. He explained
that he was the exception in this regard, as most kids responded
to the aggressive treatment in kind and started acting even
more “crazy.” There is a great deal of educational research
on the powerful role that expectations play in youth identity
development. The theory of the self-fulﬁlling prophecy
suggests that when we treat children like criminals, we help
them construct a sense of themselves that aligns with the
criminal identity we have assigned to them. What motivation
is there for them to behave otherwise? Even students who
ﬁnd ways to resist the criminalizing power relations at school
must struggle to cast themselves in a more positive light.
As the story of the students at the prison school
suggests, tough on crime policies in school exacerbate
societal and educational disenfranchisement. The lowincome, underperforming, African-American male
students from New Orleans were socially, economically,
and educationally disadvantaged before they were ever sent
to school at a prison. By obsessing over their disciplinary
infractions rather than addressing their academic challenges,
we nearly ensure that these students will drag further behind.
Incarceration poses the ultimate risk of harsh
disciplinary treatment in school because imprisonment marks
an individual for his or her lifetime, as well as his or her family
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and community. Imprisonment means total conﬁnement
and a loss of identity, and it is attended by deprivation and
violence. In his research on incarceration and the life course,
sociologist Bruce Western has shown that a prison term
shapes an individual’s job, marriage, and family prospects.45
Incarceration also signiﬁcantly shapes voting rights, as Jeff
Manza and Chris Uggen and have shown in their study of
felon disenfranchisement.46 They reveal that one in forty
Americans cannot vote due to a past felony. When you
consider voter disenfranchisement along the axis of race,
an even larger problem emerges. In some states one in four
African-American men are ineligible to vote. Suddenly, the
problem is not one borne solely by the individual or even
by the group. Voter disenfranchisement is a problem for
democracy, since it poses a threat to full representation.
There are many ways to interrupt the trend of
disproportionate minority conﬁnement, beginning with a
rethinking of our priorities for public education. The ﬁrst step
is in the direction of schools that reﬂect educational priorities
and serve as positive sources of social capital. Positive social
capital, according to sociologist Loïc Wacquant, are those
accrued institutional resources that promote a community.47
For schools to be positive sources of social capital they
must embrace tenets of inclusion rather than exclusion and
build school communities that students and their families
can be proud of and want to be a part of. A further step in
the right direction is engendered by a commitment to high
expectations for all students. Roslyn Mickelson’s work on
the achievement gap has shown that students who have clear
and positive future goals are more successful in school.48
Punitive school discipline does not engender a
positive student trajectory, while an elaboration of positive
school resources does. A recent study by scholars, Richard
Arum and Gary LaFree, proves a theory long-held by
school advocates that “states and schools with higher
teacher-student ratios produce adults who face lower risks
of incarceration.”49 Similar investments in education–
focusing on teaching staff and classroom resources–could
have the same positive result. These investments are costly,
but the ﬁnancial and social cost of school security may,
indeed, be even higher. In New Orleans post-Katrina,
the Recovery School District spent nearly $22 million
dollars for school security.50 The students in New Orleans
needed this investment in academic opportunities, and
not in the technologies and tactics of criminalization.
Ultimately, the students I studied in New Orleans
left the prison school when local activists, some of whom
had been formerly incarcerated, protested the institution
and pressured the school board to shut it down. None of
the students I worked with ever re-enrolled in traditional
public schools, and they now formally occupy the status
of the African-American male high school dropout. The
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chances that they will end up in prison are higher than the

chances that they won’t. So far, they’ve deﬁed the odds.
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BOOK INTERVIEW:
THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS
By: Richael Faithful 1
As a summer law clerk at Advancement Project
I read an excited e-mail chain about a newly-published
book, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Colorblindness, by Michelle Alexander, a professor at Ohio
State Moritz College of Law. In my experience, racial justice
advocates are always excited about race-related progressiveminded works that receive a scintilla of national attention,
because the sad truth is that much of America’s public
racial dialogue is simplistic, sterilized, and sound-bited. My
co-workers were most thrilled by the book’s provocative
name—“The New Jim Crow”—a name that accurately
colors the present crisis in the American criminal system.
Beyond the book’s name is an equally ﬁrm punch
from cover to cover. The New Jim Crow has received rave
reviews by the public interest community in particular
and social justice advocates in general. By mid-summer
I knew that I needed to interview Michelle Alexander for
The Modern American to learn more about her as an author
and advocate and her personal reasons for writing such an
inevitably controversial book. Her message is plain and
poignant: mass incarceration is the new racial caste system
of the twenty-ﬁrst century, built on colorblindness’s dual
weapons of systemic racism and willful ambivalence, and
racial caste must be ﬁnally confronted and dismantled in
the United States once and for all. Her ambitious vision is
well-outlined in The New Jim Crow, a self-described “call to
action,” which meticulously details the history and law of
mass incarceration, namely through the “War on Drugs,”
and the devastation wrought by the so-called war on racial
politics and communities of color, from black-brown
criminalization to the creation of a new underclass. Our hourlong conversation explored: why this book and why now?
Michelle Alexander makes clear that her book is
written for racial justice advocates who need to care more
about mass incarceration. In other words, she wrote this
book for people who are now in the position that she was
in about a decade ago. She acknowledged that she had
always been acutely aware of racial injustice, as a child
of an inter-racial marriage between a white mother and
black father. When younger, Alexander noticed that her
parents’ marriage had drastic consequences—both families
disapproved, but her mother was ex-communicated from
her church and disowned by her family. “My mother was
treated radically different,” Alexander observed, elaborating
that her parents faced rental discrimination, and other
mistreatment, which her mother had not experienced before.
Their hardships occurred in the backdrop of a landmark
Supreme Court case, Loving v. Virginia, which ruled bans
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against inter-racial marriage as unconstitutional. Alexander
was born within months of Loving, and she developed a
sensitivity to issues of race in America from an early age.
But, like most racially-conscience people, her political
analysis was deepened by more personal experiences. During
college, Alexander volunteered at a newly de-segregated high
school attended by poor Black children. The severity of the
segregation was so stark and so dire that in her mind it was
the ﬁrst time she witnessed “how race operated to lock poor
people of color into inferior status.” Her experience at the
schools, along with another volunteer experience during
college at a women’s prison, impressed the meaning of
systemic racism onto her political awareness. It was during this
time that she learned that race served to mark certain people
as second-class citizens in the present, even if less overtly.
This is the level at which most racial justice
advocates operate today. Many advocates defensively resist
systemic racism through policy reform at national or state
levels. In contrast, The New Jim Crow, emphasizes that
systemic racism is the tip of the stratiﬁcation iceberg, and
our criminal system is the Titanic about to come to head.
Alexander explained that the inspiration for the
book came during her time as the former American Civil
Liberties Union-Northern California (ACLU-NC) Racial
Justice Project Director. At the time, the ACLU-NC’s
main project was the Driving While Black Campaign, an
effort against law enforcement racial proﬁling. One of the
strategies adopted by the organization was litigation, which
led Alexander in search of potential plaintiffs. Screening
interviews proved to be a rigorous task, consisting of
speaking to “one young African-American man after
the other,” hearing one shocking story after the other.
One young man in particular help guide her to
“enlightenment.” He was yet another young AfricanAmerican man who entered the interview room. Unlike the
others, though, he carried a stack of papers, the weight of
which reverberated with a “plunk” when dropped onto a
table in front of Alexander. He was a clean-shaven young
man who easily articulated his numerous racial proﬁling
experiences. He had even painstakingly documented every
stop and search he had experienced in the last nine months.
By all accounts he was a perfect plaintiff—certainly a rare ﬁnd.
Alexander was eager and ready to take his case
and assumed, because of a pre-interview screening, that
he had no criminal history. But during the course of the
interview, he let it slip that he had been convicted of a
drug felony. He tried to explain that he was set up in a
drug bust during which his friend was beaten by a speciﬁc
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police officer. Before he continued, Alexander simply Crow myth that “races couldn’t mix together,” American
told him that she was sorry that she could not represent society has bought into crime and punishment myths that
him, but that she had no other choice. He was obviously justify the War on Drugs against poor Blacks. The truth
disappointed. Alexander tried to explain, “they [state is that drug crime was declining when the War on Drugs
lawyers] would tear you apart because of your record.” was declared,2 crime rates have remained steady in recent
Another otherwise ideal plaintiff was struck off the list, years even as incarceration rates have sky-rocketed,3 and
leaving Alexander sorry that he was no longer a candidate. whites, more than any other racial group, are perpetrators
It was clear, however, that he was even sorrier. of most drug crimes, despite the fact that Blacks and
He jolted up from his seat and yelled that because of his Latino/as are locked up at alarmingly high disproportions.4
The New Jim Crow goes a long way
conviction he couldn’t get a job, public
to explain these contradictions within
housing, food stamps, or other benefits
that he desperately needed to re-start
the colorblind and mass incarceration
his life. He was trapped living with
phenomena. The book’s first chapter,
his grandmother, unable to find work,
The Rebirth of Caste, explains
or a way to get unstuck. He poised
that the “law and order” rhetoric
strategically deployed in the 1960s
his words and said, “You’re no better
than the police…doing the same thing
to quell the Civil Rights Movement
that they did to me.” He told her that
ripened into justification for the
she had written him off, like all of the
Black drug “crackdown” of the
others had done, for no other reason
1980s. The lucidity of these historical
cycles, Alexander suggested in our
than that he was labeled a felon.
Several months later, the
interview, puts forth the question,
Oakland police scandal broke on the
“what will historians say about us?”
After all, she explained, “people
front page of a local paper, naming
the same officer that the young man
thought that they understood Jim
identified in his interview. Alexander
Crow until it was challenged in the
immediately realized that the young
1960s,” because fundamentally, it was
racial indifference, not racial hostility,
man was telling the truth in more ways
that kept the caste system intact.
than one. She had made a terrible
Above: Michelle Alexander;
The same ambivalence also feeds the
mistake—he was right. She reflected
Credit: Michelle Alexander
colorblindness myth—the myth that
that, even as a civil rights lawyer,
“I replicated the very same kind of discrimination and racism no longer exists and that race is therefore irrelevant—
marginalization that I was fighting against.” The reality set in as the United States willfully ignores the staggering truth
that although she intellectually knew that labels were empty that it locks up more of its racial minorities than does any
brands, “management and control of dispossessed people other country in the world.5 Moreover, Alexander shared,
trapped in second class status is eerily reminiscent of Jim colorblindness actually depends on racial exceptionalism to
Crow”—a bygone, but familiar era of her childhood—and survive. In other words, without the Barack and Michelle
she had perpetuated the same stereotyping that kept that Obamas, which are fewer in number but greater in visibility,
young man locked into the convicted persons’ underclass. mass incarceration would be exposed as so evidently a racial
He “shook me from a colorblind slumber,” caste system that its indictment of the United States would be
Alexander said.
“[I]t was like an optical illusion, “unavoidable,” as was Jim Crow exploitation during the Cold
but now, being able to see the picture clearly, the War. Alexander argued to me that, unless the “opportunity
outline was traced where it was hidden before.” to move people utterly indifferent to the harm and suffering
Alexander’s revelation after her interview that the system has inflicted” is seized, the magnitude of
experience is the driving force of the book. She stresses harm caused by mass incarceration will never be appreciated.
When I asked Alexander why she wrote this
that because the caste system, melded together by mass
incarceration, has become literally set—normalized by book, her reply, in essence, was because she could. As an
false crime rationalizations—its future depends on one accomplished civil rights lawyer-turned-law professor, she
factor alone: complicity. Historians are quick to point out lends credibility to the words, stories, and realities of less
that Jim Crow was also an accepted way-of-life until, over privileged people lost in the mass incarceration underworld.
several decades, the popular movement had swelled to its Her ultimate challenge to racial justice advocates is that
climax. As she explains in the book, just like with the Jim “reform is not enough—we need to work toward movement
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building work…not just to end mass incarceration but to
end racial caste in America.” In her mind, this enormous
undertaking begins with a very simple belief: “care,
compassion, and concern across racial lines” is necessary
to build racial empathy, the skill to “hear the voices of
people who are handcuffed” and to do something about it.
She further stressed that racial justice advocates
must send more than a political message—they must
send the message that real change means “all of us or
none of us.” She emphasized that advocates urgently
need to turn their focus to removing the stigma attached
to people convicted of felonies in the Black church and
other community pillars, so that the paralyzing fear in
these communities can transform into grassroots action.
The promise or peril of American racial justice
may hang by a thread of shared compassion, a message
pushed by then-candidate Barack Obama in his well-known
Philadelphia address. Alexander takes a sobered view of
President Barack Obama’s racial agenda, but hopes to remind

communities of color that they cannot expect anything
more from the President, who operates in a precarious,
colorblind political landscape. If anything, she urges,
“we need to be more willing to engage around aggressive
advocacy and organizing” and to rouse America from its
colorblind dream. She writes in the ﬁnal chapter, “The
Fire This Time,” that Martin Luther King Jr.’s dream had
evolved in the Poor People’s Movement into a recognition
that “the time had come for racial justice advocates to
shift from a civil rights to human rights paradigm, and
that the real work of movement building had just begun.”6
To learn more about this crisis see, The New Jim Crow: Mass
Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, Michelle Alexander,
The New Press (2010). http://www.newjimcrow.com/
1
Richael Faithful is a third-year law student at American
University, Washington College of Law, and outgoing
Editor-In-Chief of The Modern American.
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For more commentary on mass incarceration, see Modern America: Law & Politics Blog posts, “A Modern Twist on the Prison Industrial Complex,” by Isis Goldberg and “Prison Labor, Human Experimentation, & The BP Oil Disaster” by Zannie Carlson.
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PERSONAL ESSAY: MY ORDEAL OF REGAINING VOTING RIGHTS IN VIRGINIA
By: Frank Anderson 1
I was convicted of burglary in 1998, and I served two on speeding tickets?” My second thought was can you really
years and two months in jail and prison. Several years after call it a policy when, until that point, it had been a complete
serving my time, I got interested in politics and learned of a secret, and probably was never written down that moving
process where I could restore my voting rights. Although the violations could affect restoration applications. (Not to
struggle of incarceration was long over, I didn’t know that I was mention the fact that they broke their other supposed
about to begin another struggle to become a full citizen again. policy of not giving specific reasons why the Governor
In the Commonwealth of Virginia an ex-offender can exercised his discretion to deny my application). I’m not a
get a job, get married, get a driver’s license, even raise children; lawyer, but it was clear to me—it was not a policy, it was an
but he or she cannot vote unless restored by the Governor. arbitrary and capricious decision of the Governor’s Office.
I applied in 2008 to have my rights restored, but a
It was December 2009, and a coalition of groups
few months later I was denied. No reason was given. There that I joined called Virginia Restore Our Vote (which
is no appeals process, and there was a two-year waiting included the Virginia ACLU, NAACP, Poverty Law Center,
period to reapply. I thought I had done everything right. League of Women Voters, Progressive Democrats of
I met all the requirements specified on the application: I America, interfaith and many others) had recently formed
was off parole for over three years, paid all my fines, and to address the felony disenfranchisement issue on several
had not been convicted of a misdemeanor since 1998. fronts. Many of the coalition groups had been trying for
Working with some voting rights groups, activists, quite some time, even for years, to convince the Governor
and local elected officials, we tried to get Governor Tim to take action to restore rights before he left office. We
Kaine to reconsider his decision in my case.
tried conventional methods; we tried working
But beyond that, we wanted him to take action
behind-the-scenes. But Governor Kaine was
to restore the rights of the 300,000 Virginians
unwilling to do the right thing. We also knew
who were disenfranchised like myself. The
that in less than a month, Kaine was going to
Virginia State Constitution gives the Governor
be succeeded by a Republican Governor who
the power to restore rights in any way he sees
may not be as willing to make any progress on
fit, and the type of action we were asking for
the issue. That’s when I decided to go public
was not without precedent. Other governors
with this new information that they were
had issued Executive Orders to automatically
denying restorations because of traffic tickets.
restore rights, such as Governor Vilsak of
We hoped that putting some public
Iowa and Governor Crist of Florida. Even
pressure on the Governor would convince
Texas, under then-governor George W. Bush,
him to act. We held two demonstrations, had
moved to a system of automatic restoration.
frequent media coverage, and made numerous
But time was running out. Governor
public calls for Kaine. Legal teams had gone
Above: Frank
Tim Kaine’s term was set to expire in January,
into
great detail to show exactly how, and why, he
Anderson;
2010. It was exactly one month before that,
had the authority to issue a blanket restoration
Credit:Kenton Ngo
December 2009, that I received an email from
if he chose to do so. Even the Washington Post
the Virginia Secretary of the Commonwealth’s Office: agreed with our position that Governor Kaine should issue a
blanket restoration and create an automatic restoration system.
It is the policy of the Office of the
Unfortunately he lacked the courage, and in January
Governor not to provide specific reasons why
Tim Kaine went on to devote himself full-time to his position
the Governor exercises his discretion not to
as Chairman of the Democratic National Committee
grant requests for restoration of rights. . . .
as Governor Bob McDonnell was sworn into office.
However, one requirement is that applicants
In the beginning of 2010, Governor Bob
have no convictions for violations of the
McDonnell declared April to be Confederate History
law . . . prior to applying for restoration of
Month. It was at this time his office announced that they
rights. This includes moving violations, such as
would be requiring rights restoration applicants to submit
speeding.
a letter explaining why they think their rights should be
restored. Officials also stated that this letter should include
I had two reactions. First, I thought, “moving any community service, including church activities. This
violations? What kind of policy denies basic rights based “essay requirement,” as people were calling it, seemed
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legally wrong on so many levels, posing potential First and
Fifteenth Amendment problems. It was hard to believe
that this development could be ignored by the public.
It turned out that the essay requirement was a public
relations nightmare for the McDonnell Administration, just
on the heels of the ﬂap over Confederate History Month.
So once again, advocacy groups met with the Governor
and a few weeks later, they announced a new “policy” for
nonviolent offenders applying for restoration of rights.
There would be no essay requirement. Applications were to
be processed in 60 days or less. The waiting period to apply
was shortened, and the period to re-apply was also shortened.
Moreover, I learned through unofﬁcial channels
that the Governor would no longer be using trafﬁc tickets
as a sole reason to deny applicants. I immediately drove
to Richmond to hand-deliver my application. About one
month later, I received a certiﬁcate from the Governor.
The big golden seal both formalized my regained rights
and at long last, my full citizenship. The very next day,
I went to the Board of Elections to register to vote. A
few days after later, I received my voter card in the mail.
I thank Governor McDonnell for making the
restoration process even easier than it was under his
predecessors. I encourage him to do even more to
expand voting rights for every ex-offender in Virginia
who has completed his or her sentence. But the
problem remains that as long as Virginia’s Constitution
puts the power of restoration solely in the hands of
the Governor, thousands of Virginians can and will be
disenfranchised. The fact that Governor McDonnell was
able to change the “policy” so signiﬁcantly from that of
his predecessor proves that the process is truly arbitrary.

During this process, I was surprised at how many
people, even some supposed progressives, actually believed
that I shouldn’t be allowed to vote. I was being held to
a higher standard than people who run for ofﬁce, just to
get my right to vote restored. I ask them: what are the
requirements of citizenship? Didn’t I meet the requirements
when I was released from prison and I was able to work and
pay taxes? Those who say that I shouldn’t be allowed to
vote are in essence saying that my sentence was too light
and that my punishment should continue. Although I’m
out here, they insist that my civil rights remain incarcerated.
This is the moral hypocrisy that Virginians need to confront.
The Commonwealth of Virginia’s political hypocrisy
is that forty-eight other states have better restoration
laws. Why don’t people from the other states complain
about the fact that ex-offenders have their rights restored
automatically? Because it’s normal. Virginia is abnormal.
This is why we need Congress to act. Legislators
are currently considering the Democracy Restoration
Act, which will grant automatic restoration for all people
convicted of felonies (who are no longer incarcerated) to
vote in federal elections. People like me shouldn’t have to
go through years of uncertainty about whether they would
be able to vote again. They shouldn’t have to re-live the
entire conviction and incarceration process as they pore
through archived records to ﬁnd the right information
to send to the Secretary of the Commonwealth, in the
hopes that the Governor would be nice enough to grant
them a right that should never have been taken away.
I urge you to remember my story, and push Congress
to act now. Free people should not be relegated to secondclass citizenship after they have paid their debt to society.

Endnotes
Frank Anderson is an advocate against felon disenfranchisement who recently re-gained his own right-to-vote in
Virginia where he is currently is a resident. This essay is based on remarks that he made at the University of the
District of Columbia Law School in October 2010.
1

For more commentary on rights restoration for people convicted of felonies, see Modern America: Law & Politics Blog posts, “Modern
Day Poll Tax,” by Richael Faithful.
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CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHT: FIFTEENTH ANNUAL LATCRIT CONFERENCE
By: Alex Bernshteyn1
The Fifteenth Annual Latino/a Critical Legal law isolates, ostracizes, and places immigrants in Maricopa
Theory Conference, which took place from October 8- County under a spotlight of criminal investigation. Tania
10, 2010 in Denver, Colorado, was themed “The Color of Valdez, a student at the University of California, Berkeley
the Economic Crisis: Exploring the Downturn From the Boalt Hall School of Law, reminded attendees that American
Bottom Up.” The conference explored how the economic laws that affect immigrants often have unintended yet severe
crisis affects marginalized populations differently—such as consequences on immigrants’ families who were left behind
socio-economically disadvantaged people, racial minorities, in home countries. Valdez’s paper focused on The North
immigrants, and domestic violence victims—and how American Free Trade Agreement’s effect on indigenous
their realities must be a central point of discussion when women in Mexico and laid the foundation for a critical
considering economic justice and reform. Most of the analysis of how the inherent inequalities of that regional
conference attendees were law school professors who shared trade agreement push men to migrate for work, leaving their
their relevant research. Students, practitioners, and advocates wives wholly dependent on remittances for their family’s
also came to present ideas, learn from others, and build survival. Maria Pabon Lopez, from Indiana University
collective support for a
Maurer School of Law,
call to progressive action.
gave
a
comparative
A main focus of
overview of how Spain
the conference was the
has developed a creative
impact of the economic
solution to deal with its
crisis on immigrants
shrinking economy and
living in the United States.
influx of immigrants—the
Immigrants,
broadly
country has begun paying
speaking, are vulnerable
immigrants to return
to scapegoating during
to the countries from
economic
downturns,
which they came. While
as evidenced by the new
she did not advocate
Arizona
immigration
for a similar solution in
law. The opening lunch
the United States, she
presentation included an
did argue for innovative
engaging speech by Hans
immigration
reform
Meyer, from the Colorado
that acknowledges the
Immigrants’
Rights
potential clash between
Coalition, who began
an influx of immigrants
by asking immigrants in
and
an
economic
the room to stand. Only
downturn, and for a
a handful of people
solution that preserves
stood up. He then asked Above: Plenary speakers of “Latina/o Education and Justice: Leading Voices, the dignity of all people.
Lessons Learned.” Credit: Tayyab Mahmud
those whose parents or
During the event’s
grandparents were immigrants to stand, those who were in main dinner, Mary Romero, from Arizona State University,
love with an immigrant to stand, those who had immigrants gave a powerful speech, bolstered by photographs, focusing
living in their neighborhood to stand, and, finally, those on Arizona’s new unjust immigration laws. She offered
who simply were in solidarity with immigrants to stand. anecdotal information related to the new laws, including
By the end of the speech, the whole room was on its feet. how listening to Mexican music or not looking directly
Many of the panel discussions on opening day into the eyes of police officers may constitute reasonable
focused on the current immigrants’ rights battle. For suspicion for police to stop a person for “papers.” Some of
example, experts on a panel titled “Immigration, Economic the photographs featured Latinos and Latinas being shoved
Crisis, & the State” examined U.S. immigration policy from into the back of police cars. Other photographs were
a number of angles. Gabriella Sanchez, from the Arizona captioned and showed children crying out hysterically, “they
State University School of Justice and Social Inquiry, gave told me to shut up and that mommy was leaving.” The
an anthropological evaluation of how Arizona’s immigration real impact of anti-immigrant backlash during the current
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Great Recession spoke for itself in these photographs.
Other panels explored the experiences of people
who not only suffer economically, but also endure other
forms of injustice. Robert Ashford, from Syracuse
University, conveyed his thesis that the economic crisis
did not cause poverty, but rather that poverty caused
the economic crisis. Judy Goldscheid, from The City
University of New York School of Law, spoke on the
hidden dangers of economic fluctuations in the family
setting, where domestic violence tends to increase with
economic hardship. James Hackney, from Northeastern
University School of Law, made the case that critical
race theory must be examined as an inherent element in

economic crises because race is a critical part of every
aspect of solution-building.
Danne Johnson, from
Oklahoma City University School of Law, argued that
lifeline non-governmental organizations, which provide
food and shelter to those in poverty, should benefit from
government bailouts because they provide essential
services that the government has neglected to offer.
These examples of innovative and thoughtful
speakers, theories, and arguments are just a small sample from
the Fifteenth Annual LatCrit Conference. Over 200 attendees
gathered for meals and ideas. Each of us exchanged smiles
and handshakes upon recognizing that we were advocates
for the same issue: social justice during economic crisis.

LatCrit student Scholars and one of the LatCrit founders cutting a cake to mark LatCrit’s Quinceañera.
Credit: Tayyab Mahmud

Endnotes
Alexandra Bernshteyn is a third-year law student at American University, Washington College of Law. She serves
as an Assistant Marketing Editor for The Modern American, and she attended this year’s LatCrit conference on the
publication’s behalf.

1

For brief interviews of LatCrit attendees and participants, see The Modern American
website at www.wcl.american.edu/modernamerican.
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Honoring the Past, Celebrating the Future,
The Women’s Bar Association of DC, and
The Modern American Third Annual Dinner

Above: Former and current
TMA staff members, Cheryl
Chado, Heron Greenesmith,
and Julia Saladino, at pre-dinner reception.
Credit: Hilary Schwab
Bottom: Caption: Associate
Dean for Library and Information Resources, Billie Jo
Kaufman, and former TMA
Editor-In-Chief, Mara Giorgio, Volume 4.
Credit: Hilary Schwab

Above: TMA staff member
and WBA and WBA Foundation attendees at
pre-dinner reception.
Credit: Hilary Schwab
Left: Keynote speaker,
Professor Brenda Smith,
American University, The
Washington College of Law,
November 3, 2010.
Credit: Hilary Schwab

Above: Representatives from three student organizations, including TMA, presenting donation to Jessica Salsbury of The
Tahirih Justice Center from month-long fundraising efforts
for the organization. Credit: Hilary Schwab
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COMMENTARY: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE BP OIL SPILL: DOES ANYONE CARE
ABOUT THE “SMALL PEOPLE” OF COLOR?
By: Perry E. Wallace1
Introduction
“We care about the small people” declared BP
Chairman Carl-Henric Svanburg on June 16, 2010, just eight
weeks after the start of the company’s now-famous oil spill.
Ironically, the Swedish corporate chief uttered those clumsy
words while leading a campaign to stem the growing, spillrelated reputational damage to BP. Compounding the irony
in Mr. Svanburg’s statement is the fact that he had been sent
as a substitute for British CEO Tony Hayward, whose earlier
efforts to repair BP’s corporate image had also failed miserably.
Throughout these missteps, the media were
providing the world with daily images of the spill. Every
day, we watched as 2.6 million gallons of oil surged out of
the ocean ﬂoor, constantly and uncontrolled, into the Gulf
of Mexico. Surely this was a time for curative action and
adroit public relations. Against this background, the highlypublicized gaffe was an especially aggravating contribution to
BP’s loss of favor in a time of great crisis. The spill betrayed
a gigantic, multi-dimensional corporate ineptitude—not
merely in linguistic and cultural facility but also, more broadly,
in corporate governance and social responsibility. With the
oil leak ﬁnally plugged (we hope), one would think that
the ﬂow of BP corporate governance failures should have
similarly been plugged. But this apparently has not happened.
Moreover, BP is not the only actor facing disapproval on
the long and arduous path to recovery. Governmental
and other actors have also incurred the wrath of many
and varied critics ranging from environmental groups and
ordinary citizens to politicians, businesses and the media.
On the other hand, certain affected groups
have scarcely been mentioned in efforts to address the
environmental, economic, social and cultural impacts of
the oil spill. These forgotten groups include minorities,
(small) businesses and communities that have also suffered.
In fact—as usually happens with environmental justice
matters—they have endured disproportionately greater
injury and they have received disproportionately less
assistance, by comparison with other impacted persons and
groups. The following discussion explores the general nature
and status of environmental justice, describes the plight of
traditionally forgotten groups in the BP oil spill recovery
efforts, and makes some observations about the elements
of a curative approach to the problems of those groups.
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Environmental Justice: Of
Pollution

People, Power and

One commonality between environmental justice
and other social and economic justice topics is the notion
of power imbalances: (1) the relative powerlessness of
those being harmed and (2) the superior power of those
causing, or allowing, that harm. Whatever the technical
classiﬁcation of the more powerful forces (governmental,
corporate or individual) and whatever the impetus to
cause or allow the harm (animus, greed, negligence,
or mere thoughtlessness), the imbalance of power is
a core operative element in social and economic injustice.
Obviously, the environmental or other injustice
is grounded in some actual or perceived difference
between those with power and those without it. Equally
clear is the fact that the more powerful groups view
themselves as being more privileged or entitled based
on that difference. Focusing on power highlights a key
enabling feature of the negative interaction between the two
opposing groups. Further, certain pivotal characteristics
of powerlessness (ignorance, lack of resources, lack of
organization and lack of leadership) not only shed light
on its causes but also contain the keys to the cures for the
powerlessness and perhaps even the power imbalance itself.
Environmental Justice Executive Order 12898,
“Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in
Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations,”
signed by President William J. Clinton in 1994, sought
to establish an ofﬁcial federal policy on environmental
justice.2 The Executive Order required each federal
agency to “make achieving environmental justice part of
its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate,
disproportionately high and adverse human health or
environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities
on minority populations and low-income populations.”
This policy was a welcome development and
appears to have resulted in some improvement in
environmental justice matters, but a thorough analysis of
the years since the Executive Order conﬁrms that progress
has not been, and will not be, automatic. Only determined
advocacy and leadership will produce successful solutions
to environmental justice problems. Frederick Douglass
once famously declared that “Power concedes nothing
without a demand. It never did and it never will.”3 The
following discussion of the BP oil spill’s impact on people
of color illustrates the truth of Douglass’ declaration.
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The Devastating Impact of the Oil Spill:
Interconnected and Cumulative Harm to People of
Color
From the start of the spill, there was both lay
speculation and professional study on the magnitude
and types of harms that would result from it. Although
BP and the federal government at times downplayed
the potential impact, the overwhelming public and
scientiﬁc consensus was that we were witnessing a
historic environmental, economic and social catastrophe
in the making. In fact, we were: BP was creating the
largest environmental catastrophe in American history.
On the other hand, United States Representatives Mike
Honda (D-Calif.) and Anh “Joseph” Cao (R-La.) concluded
that the particularly harsh way in which minority communities
were affected during the recovery period was not well-reported:
What is equally disastrous, but less
frequently reported, is the impact to the
physical health, economy and livelihoods
of communities living adjacent to the Gulf
Coast. Among these communities, perhaps the
most vulnerable are thousands of Southeast Asian
and African-American families. The adverse effects
experienced by this population are potent and
unique.4 (Emphasis added)
As these observations become public knowledge,
they shed light on the paucity of basic understandings
about the minority communities in that region. For
example, most Americans (including many in the
local media) hardly knew about the African-American
commercial ﬁshing community on the Gulf Coast. Many
of these families have been in the ﬁshing business for
generations, going back to a time when people in the area
spoke mainly French. These and other African-Americans
are now beginning to explain how the BP spill not only
brought to them the same harms affecting others in the
region but also exacerbated historic race-based problems.
Speciﬁcally, African-American businesses are not
receiving many of the oil spill cleanup contracts. Nor
are they as likely to be hired by white-owned business as
employees when those contracts are let—other than for
the most hazardous and dangerous of jobs. Additionally,
the substantial lingering effects of Hurricane Katrina had
already weakened this community in fundamental and
disproportionate ways. Finally, there is the matter of waste
disposal from the oil spill. Where is the waste being sent? Here,
the BP oil spill matter becomes both symbol and substance
of the environmental justice dilemma. The following quote
from Robert Bullard, Director of the Environmental Justice
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Resource Center at Clark Atlanta University, puts it this way:
Given the sad history of waste disposal in
the southern United States, it should be no
surprise to anyone that the BP disposal plan
looks a lot like “Dumping in Dixie,” and
has become a core environmental justice
concern, especially among low-income and
people of color communities in the Gulf
coast—communities whose residents have
historically borne more than their fair share
of solid waste landﬁlls and hazardous waste
facilities before and after natural and manmade disasters.5
Similarly, Southeast Asian ﬁshermen make up onethird of the 13,000 ﬁshing vessels registered in the Gulf
Coast. Among the phenomena creating special challenges
for Southeast Asians is the language barrier, which, along
with general problems of discrimination and distrust of
government, makes for a stultifying blockage in gaining
access to mainstream services and information. Their
history, like of that of the African-American communities,
is one of challenges and difﬁculties that left them especially
vulnerable to the oil spill: arrival in the U.S. as political
refugees, harsh resettlement camp conditions, racial
discrimination and isolation, and, of course, Katrina.
The United Houma Nation of that region has been
recognized by Louisiana but not by the federal government.
Sources allege that oil-related interests have successfully
opposed federal recognition in order to have access to their
lands for oil and gas operations. Federal protection would
bestow signiﬁcant rights, beneﬁts and protections to this
group and increase their prospects for responding properly to
the devastations of Katrina and the oil spill. In the meantime,
oil from the spill is slowly threatening their livelihood and
culture. It has destroyed oyster plots, ruined crab traps
and blocked shrimp trawlers from choice ﬁshing grounds.
These examples tell an all-too-typical story of
environmental injustice in action, replete with all the usual
characteristics of power imbalance, unequal treatment,
widespread indifference and tragic consequences. It is
with these examples in mind that the search for solutions
must proceed. What should be the nature of solutions
to this particular environmental justice dilemma?
Seeking
Injustice;

Solutions
Some

to

Environmental
Considerations

From May 27 through June 10, the National
Ofﬁce of the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP) conducted an extensive
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investigation of the BP oil spill.
After touring
affected areas in the Gulf and meeting with important
constituencies involved in, or affected by, the spill, the
NAACP issued a report, BP Oil Drilling Disaster—NAACP
Investigation (the NAACP Report) containing a list of
Recommendations.6 Those Recommendations were the
result of a thorough and considered process and deserve
serious consideration in seeking solutions to the BP oil spill.
The main points of the Recommendations are as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Financial Support for Community Based
Organizations
Accessible and Effective Claims Process
Physical and Mental Health Care for All
Equal Access to Contracting Opportunities for
Businesses Owned by People of Color
Community and Worker Safety Provisions
Impact Assessments—Analysis of Physical and
Mental Health, Financial, and Socio-Cultural Short
and Long Term Impacts
Safe, Quality Housing Provisions for Displaced
Persons
Federal Recognition for the Houma Tribe
Direct Troubled Asset Relief Program and Small
Business Administration Funding to Community
Development Financial Institutions
Improved Information Dissemination
Comprehensive Ongoing Environmental
Assessments
Preservation of the Gulf, Marshlands, Estuaries,
and Other Waterways and Dependent Sea Life
Clean Energy, Green Jobs, and Increased
Regulation of Oil Drilling

Without question, the Recommendations are
expansive and would require considerable expenditures of
money and time. The simple reality is that such a sacrifice
is necessary to bring about a true and permanent solution
to the problems of the affected communities. First, to a
great degree, these expenditures would comprise resources
that should have already been applied over many past
years. Past failures set the stage for the disproportionately
calamitous impact of the oil spill on these groups. Second,
the expenditures would address the larger economic and
socio-cultural infrastructure of the communities and
make them stronger and less vulnerable—a benefit that
would be shared far beyond the communities themselves.
These considerations speak to the dire need for just the
sort of expansive, comprehensive approach suggested
by the Recommendations in the NAACP Report.
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Conclusion
The BP oil spill, unfortunately, has generated
yet another sad example of environmental injustice.
Moreover, the stakes are higher than ever before, as
the tragedies associated with it promise to be greater
than ever before. As discussed in this article, the
elements of environmental justice dilemmas are always
profound and they set the stage for profoundly adverse
consequences for the affected communities and others.
Yet, lawmakers and other leaders could turn
this tragedy into something more like a victory, if they
have the will and the courage. Failure to do so, in an era
in which natural threats are now augmented by humanmade errors such as anthropogenic global warming and
in which human-made political and economic instability
reign, only promises great trouble for us all. Guidance
such as that so thoughtfully prepared and offered in the
NAACP Report should be the basis for forceful action
by all those concerned with good governance in society.
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LEGISLATIVE UPDATES
By: Keyla Bade
H.R.5136 “National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2011” and “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
The National Defense Authorization Act is the
annual appropriations bill, approving Department of Defense
military activities for ﬁscal year 2011.2 An amendment
to the National Defense Authorization Act, which the
House has already approved and included in Section 536
of the National Defense Authorization Act, would repeal
of the ban on homosexuals from serving openly in the
military.3 The 1993 law, widely known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell”(DADT), is mandated by federal law and codiﬁed in
10 U.S.C. § 654 and prohibits homosexuals from serving
in the military stating that it would “create an unacceptable
risk to the high standards of morale, good order and
discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military
capability.”4 More than 13,000 people in the military have
been forced to leave since the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
policy has been in place, including more than 400 last year.5
The language of Section 536 allows Congress to
vote to repeal DADT“with actual repeal occurring 60 days
after the completion of a study due December 1, 2010.6
The study conducted by the Pentagon Working Group
examined the effects of fully integrating homosexuals into
the armed forces, considering such issues as whether gay
and heterosexual troops could be required to share housing
and whether the military would be required to extend
beneﬁts to same-sex partners.7 President Obama, Defense
Secretary Robert M. Gates, and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen, must then certify that this
new policy would not impede military effectiveness or “unit
cohesion.”8 Army Chief of Staff General George Casey,
Jr. said that “[r]epealing the law before the completion
of the review will be seen by the men and women of the
Army as a reversal of our commitment to hear their views
before moving forward.”9 This legislation represents a
major step for gay rights advocates who have been trying
to repeal this policy since its inception in 1993, arguing
that it effectively allows one of the nation’s most powerful
agencies to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.10
Senator John McCain (R-AZ) and other critics
of the bill argue that repealing DADT “would “be really
harmful to the morale and battle effectiveness of our
military.”11 Supporters believe that the repeal would be a
positive change reﬂective of the U.S.’s shifting sentiments
towards gay and lesbian people. “In the land of the free
and the home of the brave, it is long past time for Congress
to end this un-American policy,” said Representative
Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), who is the ﬁrst female openly
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gay congressional representative.12
President Obama
is also pleased with the House’s passage of the repeal
saying, “[t]his legislation will help make our armed forces
even stronger and more inclusive by allowing gay and
lesbian soldiers to serve honestly and with integrity.”13
Patrick Murphy (D-PA) ﬁrst introduced the
amendment on April 10, 2010. It was ﬁrst referred to
the House Committee on Armed Services. On May
27, 2010, the House of Representatives approved the
amendment. The bill was passed on May 28, 2010
with 229 Democrats and ﬁve Republicans in favor.
Senate received it on June 28, 2010 and placed it on the
Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders.
On September 21, 2010, the National Defense
Authorization Act was stalled on a 56-43 vote, four short
of the sixty votes needed to overcome the Republican
opposition and begin the debate.14 On October 12, 2010, a
federal district court judge, Judge Virginia Phillips, ordered
the military to immediately stop enforcing DADT.15 The
case was brought forth by the Log Cabin Republicans, a
19,000-member partisan gay advocacy group that includes
current and former military members. The group argued
during a two-week trial in July 2010 that the policy is
unconstitutional and should be struck down.16 The judge
ultimately ruled in their favor on the grounds that DADT
violated Due Process and the First Amendment rights of
gay service members.17 On October 14, the Department
of Justice asked the judge to suspend her ruling while the
government prepared a formal appeal.18 In its appeal, the
Department of Justice argued that repeated and sudden
changes in DADT would be “enormously disruptive and
time-consuming, particularly at a time when this nation is
involved in combat operations overseas.”19 Although the
District Court upheld the injunction, effectively repealing
DADT, the Ninth Circuit granted a stay requested by the
Department of Justice, which re-instated the policy.20
The Pentagon announced that it will comply with
the Ninth Circuit order to retain the policy, but gay rights
advocates have cautioned service members to avoid revealing
their sexual orientation in the meantime.21 On October
21, 2010, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced
that the Pentagon, in order to mitigate any confusion or
unjust discharges, is changing the way under which DADT
discharges are processed.22 He issued a directive instructing
the secretaries of each branch of the armed services to
personally sign off on the dismissal of any gay or lesbian
service member under the policy. Further, the Pentagon’s
chief legal counsel and its top personnel ofﬁcial have to
coordinate all DADT discharges.23 At the time of print,
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time of print, a DADT repeal bill had just passed into
law, after vigorous efforts were made to pass the measure.
S.729 “Development, Relief, and Education for Alien
Minors Act of 2009”
The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien
Minors Act of 2009 (DREAM Act) is legislation that
would allow certain undocumented immigrant students
the opportunity to apply for permanent residency.25 The
Act would amend the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 “to repeal the
denial of an unlawful alien’s eligibility for higher education
benefits based on state residence unless a U.S. national is
similarly eligible without regard to such state residence.”26
Under the DREAM Act, those eligible are
undocumented students between the ages of twelve and
thirty-five of “good moral character”, who arrived to the
United States before the age of sixteen, have lived in the
United States for five consecutive years prior to the Act’s
enactment, and who have graduated from a high school in the
United States or have earned a GED. These students would
then have the opportunity to gain conditional permanent
residency.27 Within six years of approval for conditional
permanent residency, the individual must complete at least
two years in a program for a bachelor’s degree or higher
in the United States or serve in the uniformed services for
at least two years and, if discharged, receive an honorable
discharge.28 If the individual does not meet these
qualifications within six years, the conditional residency
will be revoked and he or she will be once again removable.
Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) introduced this
Act on March 26, 2009 and it currently has forty sponsors.
After its introduction in the Senate, the Act was referred
to the Committee on the Judiciary. The companion
bill in the House of Representatives, the American
Dream Act of 2009, was also introduced on March 26,
2009 and was referred to the Subcommittee on Higher
Education, Lifelong Learning, and Competitiveness.
Similar forms of this bill have been introduced in
Congress before but have not progressed.29 The DREAM
Act has received a lot of media attention though, stirring up
documented and undocumented people alike to place pressure
on Congress to move this bill forward. On September
14, 2010, the DREAM Act was placed on the agenda to
be included as an amendment to the National Defense
Authorization Act for 2011. The Senate was scheduled to
vote on September 21, 2010 on whether to attach the measure
to the Act but a Republican filibuster halted the debate. As
of September 22, 2010, Richard Durbin introduced the bill
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once again along with Richard Lugar, and it had two sponsors.
The possibility for full immigration reform this
year is looking bleak, but the passage of the DREAM
Act would be a significant step in that direction. As
Majority Leader Reid assured, “We must have immigration
reform. When we have enough groups telling me
that we can’t do it this year, then we will consider the
DREAM Act alone. But we are not at that point now.”30
The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination against Women
The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) is often regarded
as an international bill of rights for women. CEDAW defines
what constitutes discrimination against women and designs
an implementation plan, to be fulfilled by each country in
agreement to end it.31 The convention asserts women’s rights
and freedoms to political, economic, and social equality.32
The Convention was adopted by the United Nations’
General Assembly in 1976 and has been ratified by 186
countries. The United States is one of only seven countries
that have not ratified CEDAW. The others are Iran, Sudan,
Somalia, Palau, Nauru, and Tonga.33 Commentators believe
that the U.S. may have put off ratifying CEDAW partly
because of national conservative sentiments that oppose or
fail to fully support the Convention’s affirmation of women’s
right to reproductive choice. For example, the Convention
provides for the right to equally shared responsibility for
child-rearing by both sexes, the right of child-care including
mandated child-care facilities and maternity leave, and the
right to reproductive choice and family planning.34 CEDAW
is the only treaty that has made such specific provisions for
reproductive rights and family planning. Because CEDAW
is an international convention, the Senate must ratify it.
According to CEDAW, discrimination is “. . . any
distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis
of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing
or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise by
women . . .” 35 Countries that ratify the Convention are
required to implement measures that would eradicate
any kind of discrimination against women.36 These
measures must include acknowledging the equality
between men and women in the country’s constitution.
Further, the country must establish and enforce equal
legal protection through legislative measures.37 Countries
that have ratified the Convention are legally bound to
put its provisions into practice and must submit national
reports at least once every four years concerning measures
they have taken to comply with their treaty obligations.38
The Obama Administration put CEDAW on the list
of priorities for ratification in May 2009.39 In November
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6, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said during a
speech in Washington, DC, “there is nothing that has been
more important to me over the course of my lifetime than
advancing the rights of women and girls. And it is now a
cornerstone of American foreign policy.”40 Secretary Clinton
has been expected to revive the discussion of women’s
issues on Capitol Hill. In March 2010, Secretary Clinton
reassured the United Nations Commission on the Status of
Women that the administration would “continue to work
for the ratiﬁcation of CEDAW.”41 However, months have
passed since this statement and there has been no substantial
action from executive and legislative bodies. Several human
rights groups emphasize the importance of CEDAW’s
ratiﬁcation, believing that it would add credence to the equal
status of women internationally as well as domestically.42
The Obama Administration faces continued pressure to
urge the Senate to introduce this Convention and schedule
hearings in order to seriously contemplate ratiﬁcation.

United States’ lack of commitment to refugees. It comes
thirty years after the landmark Refugee Protection Act of
1980 led by the late Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA).
Many people believe that since the passage the 1980 Refugee
Protection Act, the United States has fallen short of meeting
its obligations. The advocacy organization, Human Rights
First, elucidates this point in stating, “ . . . [A] barrage of
new laws and policies have undermined the institution of
asylum in the United States, leading this country to deny
asylum or other protection to victims of persecution.”50
Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (DVT) introduced the Refugee Protection Act of 2010 in
the Senate on March 15, 2010 with four sponsors. After
it was introduced, it was referred to the Committee on
Judiciary. Hearings were held and the Act was discussed
on May 19, 2010. This Act is the Senate’s solid attempt
to address and resolve some of the refugee and asylum
systems’ most serious issues and to sincerely consider and
recommit to the interests of refugees and asylum seekers.

S.3113 “Refugee Protection Act of 2010”
The Refugee Protection Act amends the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that would
strengthen the United States’ commitment to refugees who
have ﬂed their countries due to persecution or torture.43
One of the major provisions of this Act is the elimination
of the one-year limit for ﬁling asylum claims currently
placed on refugees in the U.S.44 The Act also authorizes the
U.S. Attorney General to appoint counsel for refugees to
represent them throughout their proceedings.45 Previously,
many refugees have had to advocate for themselves during
their proceedings. Studies have shown that asylum seekers,
of whom a third have counsel, are six times more likely to
be granted asylum if they have legal representation.46 The
Refugee Protection Act also deals with concerns regarding
aliens’ detention periods. The Act directs the Secretary
of Homeland Security to establish speciﬁc conditions
of detention and to give notice of charges to the court
and to the individuals within forty-eight hours of the
alien’s detention, guaranteeing a system of faster review.47
Furthermore, the Act develops the list of social
categories upon which asylum claims can be based. As of
now, when an individual claims to be seeking asylum based on
“membership in a particular social group”, it has generally been
difﬁcult for individuals who have ﬂed a country because of
gang violence, gender discrimination, or gender orientation.
The broader deﬁnition of “social groups” in S.3113 can
be used to include these individuals.48 The deﬁnitions of
“terrorist activity” and “terrorist organization” are also
reﬁned and narrowed in order to protect refugees that do not
pose a threat to U.S. security from inappropriate exclusion.49
This Act emerges from numerous criticisms of the
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H.R. 3564 “Children’s Act for Responsible
Employment of 2009”
The Children’s Act for Responsible Employment
of 2009 (CARE Act) amends the child labor provisions
relating to agricultural work in the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA).51 Currently, FLSA law allows for children as young
as twelve years old to be hired to work agricultural jobs, such
as harvesting fruits and vegetables. The law does not place
any limits on the number of hours per week a child can work
or on how early an employer can require the child to report
to work.52 Critics argue that this lack of regulations exposes
children to risks of exploitation as well as educational
compromises, since at present, FLSA does not mandate
hourly limits for children’s work on school days.53 Human
rights groups report that the drop-out rate for children who
work in agriculture is four times higher than the national rate.54
The CARE Act revises the age requirement for agricultural
employment under FLSA regulations, authorizing it to apply
to any child under the age of eighteen unless that child is
working for his or her parents or on a family-owned farm.55
The Act also increases civil and criminal penalties for
violating the law in order to ensure employer compliance.56
Representative Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA)
introduced the CARE Act on November 15, 2009, and it
currently has ninety-one sponsors. After its introduction,
the Act was referred to the Subcommittee on Workforce
Protections on November 16, 2009. The Act is supported
by over eighty leading organizations including the American
Federation for Teachers (AFT), the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the National
Parent Teacher Association (PTA), and Human Rights
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Watch. “The United States is a developing country when
it comes to child farm workers,” said Zama Coursen-Neff,
deputy director of the Children’s Rights Division at Human
Rights Watch. “Children who pick America’s food should
at least have the same protections as those who serve it.”57
Children and human rights advocates were

encouraged recently after the Labor Department announced
a large increase in the ﬁnes that farmers can face for
employing children, to as much as $11,000 per child58. For
a deeper rooted and longer lasting change to come about,
however, the law has to change and it is unlikely that the
CARE Act will get out of committee during this Congress.
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The Modern AMericAn’s reAders’ survey
As The Modern American reaches its seventh volume, a lot has changed since we published our first issue in
Spring 2005—including our readership.
One of TMA’s most unique attributes is its audience and how the publication’s content is shaped by our
audience. Unlike most law publications, TMA strives to publish accessible legal scholarship, rather than
esoteric law articles. In other words, we want all readers, particularly those without legal training, to readily
understand our content, and clearly appreciate how the valuable information contained within each article
is relevant to our lives. Accessibility has always been one of TMA’s goals, yet, over the years, we know
less and less about YOU, our audience. Even as we begin to offer TMA on a variety of new platforms,
including the Digital Commons, which allows TMA to learn about its subscribers, we still know little about
our readers.
In an effort to learn about who you are, what you like, and how you read TMA, we are launching a readers’
survey during winter 2010. From December until February, all TMA readers—whether you are a devoted
reader or just picked TMA up at an office or news-stand—are invited to participate in the readers’ audit.
Tell us who you are, what you enjoy, and how we can improve.
There are two ways to participate: 1) you may fill-out the survey printed on the back of this page, enclose it
in a self-stamped envelope, and send it by March 1 to:
The Modern American
American University Washington College of Law
4801 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Suite 615
Washington D.C., 20016
OR
2) you may go to our online survey at http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/556X3Q6.
You are welcomed to offer us as little or as much information as you like. Most importantly, we want to
learn more about you, as a reader, and we want to learn more about what you think of our publication. The
information you provide is for TMA purposes only and will not be shared with third parties.
And, to thank you for your participation, a completed survey submitted by March 1, will automatically
enter you into a raffle for an Ipod shuffle.
TMA continues to grow and change, specifically as a result of our Strategic Plan initiative completed
this year. The current Executive Board was able to re-structure the publication, attract fresh and exciting
content, add new content through our digital platforms, and build our visibility in the legal field and
beyond. We are energized to continue our engagement with you—our readers—and look forward to at
least six more groundbreaking years as one of the leading publications dedicated to diversity in the U.S.
Thank you!
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The Modern American Founders’ Day Symposium
Minority Majority: The Social and Legal Implications of a Post-White America
Minorities are expected to become the majority in America by the year 2050, ending nearly 300 years
of a white majority. How have societies dealt with such changes throughout history, and how will
Americans react to this change? Does recent backlash, such as elements of the Tea Party Movement,
indicate growing recognition of, and resistance to, this reality? Or does the election of President
Obama and the appointment of Justice Sotomayor indicate that the American people have already
begun to accept this inevitability? Finally, will the constitutional and statutory protections set in place
to protect minorities continue to be relevant in a Minority Majority America?
March 23, 6:00 pm – 8:00 pm, Washington College of Law, Room 603
Register at http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/founders/2011/20110323a.cfm.
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